東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry./
作者:	Kidder, William G.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	279 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03B.
標題:	Ethics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28713414
ISBN:	9798535594958

The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry.
Kidder, William G.

The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 279 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this dissertation, I defend the view that, despite empathy's susceptibility to problematic biases, we can and should cultivate empathy to aid our understanding of our own values and the values of others. I argue that empathy allows us to critically examine and potentially revise our values by considering concrete moral problems and our own moral views from the perspective of another person. Appropriately calibrated empathy helps us achieve a critical distance from our own moral perspective and is thus tied to impartiality in moral inquiry. In defending this role for empathy in moral inquiry, I draw on empirical work from psychology and neuroscience to support a constructionist account of emotion, according to which we can develop more wide-ranging, fine-grained emotion concepts and empathetic capacities by seeking diverse experiences, communication, and engagement with art. I then defend the value of this effortful correction of empathy bias, arguing (1) that impartial moral inquiry ought to utilize empathy as a check on motivated reasoning and presumptions regarding what count as appropriate solutions to moral problems, and (2) that compassionate moral inquiry ought to involve empathy as a means of recognizing others as authentic moral agents that can make valuable contributions to moral debate. Lastly, I draw on insights from pragmatist philosophy to critique Adam Smith's empathy-based account of the "impartial spectator" and defend a conception of impartiality grounded in fallibilistic, empathetic method.

ISBN: 9798535594958Subjects--Topical Terms:

517264
Ethics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Adam Smith

The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry.
LDR:02670nmm a2200385 4500 001 2351093
005 20221107085252.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798535594958
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28713414
035 $a AAI28713414
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kidder, William G. $0 (orcid)0000-0002-3764-020X $3 3690641
245 1 4 $a The Role of Empathy in Moral Inquiry.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 279 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: D'Cruz, Jason.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a In this dissertation, I defend the view that, despite empathy's susceptibility to problematic biases, we can and should cultivate empathy to aid our understanding of our own values and the values of others. I argue that empathy allows us to critically examine and potentially revise our values by considering concrete moral problems and our own moral views from the perspective of another person. Appropriately calibrated empathy helps us achieve a critical distance from our own moral perspective and is thus tied to impartiality in moral inquiry. In defending this role for empathy in moral inquiry, I draw on empirical work from psychology and neuroscience to support a constructionist account of emotion, according to which we can develop more wide-ranging, fine-grained emotion concepts and empathetic capacities by seeking diverse experiences, communication, and engagement with art. I then defend the value of this effortful correction of empathy bias, arguing (1) that impartial moral inquiry ought to utilize empathy as a check on motivated reasoning and presumptions regarding what count as appropriate solutions to moral problems, and (2) that compassionate moral inquiry ought to involve empathy as a means of recognizing others as authentic moral agents that can make valuable contributions to moral debate. Lastly, I draw on insights from pragmatist philosophy to critique Adam Smith's empathy-based account of the "impartial spectator" and defend a conception of impartiality grounded in fallibilistic, empathetic method.
590 $a School code: 0668.
650 4 $a Ethics. $3 517264
650 4 $a Empathy. $3 532108
650 4 $a Morality. $3 3561985
650 4 $a Novels. $3 3566249
650 4 $a Emotions. $3 524569
650 4 $a Philosophers. $3 558041
650 4 $a Bias. $2 gtt $3 1374837
650 4 $a Personality psychology. $3 2144789
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
653 $a Adam Smith
653 $a Emotion
653 $a Empathy
653 $a Impartiality
653 $a Moral inquiry
653 $a Pragmatism
690 $a 0394
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0625
710 2 $a State University of New York at Albany. $b Philosophy. $3 1669646
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-03B.
790 $a 0668
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28713414