東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition./
作者:	Yao, Xinlu.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	235 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Sensitivity analysis. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28417476
ISBN:	9798534673432

Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition.
Yao, Xinlu.

Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 235 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2021.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

This dissertation covers two innovative topics related to horizontal mergers. One chapter investigates the welfare effect of mergers in the platform markets; another one studies the impact of mergers where firms conduct dynamic price competition with asymmetric information.In Chapter 1, I analyze the welfare effects of lowering the costs to buyers of searching and multihoming in a setting with multiple two-sided platforms. The analysis is motivated by observed changes following the 2017 acquisition of IronPlanet, which is an online auction marketplace for used heavy equipment by Ritchie Brothers Auctioneers, which operates the largest offline auction marketplace. As is quite common after platform mergers, RBA maintained both platforms but made it easier for buyers of equipment to search across the platforms (multihoming), which has the potential to render the allocation of equipment more efficient, benefitting both buyers and sellers. These efficiencies could offset the market power created by the merger. I use pre- and post-merger transaction data to estimate a new model of search and auction entry by buyers and quantify the increase in welfare effects of the observed changes. Depending on the specification, the proportion of multihoming buyers increases substantially (by 50% in the baseline specification), and the total surplus can increase by more than 8%, although heterogeneity exists in the welfare impact on different market participants. I also consider several additional counterfactuals involving changes in commission and changes in equipment allocation across the marketplaces.In Chapter 2, my coauthors and I model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete information Nash levels even when the privately observed state variables are restricted to lie in narrow ranges. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and we show that our model can explain changes in price levels and price dynamics after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.

ISBN: 9798534673432Subjects--Topical Terms:

3560752
Sensitivity analysis.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Horizontal mergers

Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition.
LDR:03480nmm a2200385 4500 001 2351019
005 20221107085233.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798534673432
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28417476
035 $a AAI28417476
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Yao, Xinlu. $3 3690558
245 1 0 $a Essays on Platform Mergers and Dynamic Price Competition.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 235 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Sweeting, Andrew.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2021.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation covers two innovative topics related to horizontal mergers. One chapter investigates the welfare effect of mergers in the platform markets; another one studies the impact of mergers where firms conduct dynamic price competition with asymmetric information.In Chapter 1, I analyze the welfare effects of lowering the costs to buyers of searching and multihoming in a setting with multiple two-sided platforms. The analysis is motivated by observed changes following the 2017 acquisition of IronPlanet, which is an online auction marketplace for used heavy equipment by Ritchie Brothers Auctioneers, which operates the largest offline auction marketplace. As is quite common after platform mergers, RBA maintained both platforms but made it easier for buyers of equipment to search across the platforms (multihoming), which has the potential to render the allocation of equipment more efficient, benefitting both buyers and sellers. These efficiencies could offset the market power created by the merger. I use pre- and post-merger transaction data to estimate a new model of search and auction entry by buyers and quantify the increase in welfare effects of the observed changes. Depending on the specification, the proportion of multihoming buyers increases substantially (by 50% in the baseline specification), and the total surplus can increase by more than 8%, although heterogeneity exists in the welfare impact on different market participants. I also consider several additional counterfactuals involving changes in commission and changes in equipment allocation across the marketplaces.In Chapter 2, my coauthors and I model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete information Nash levels even when the privately observed state variables are restricted to lie in narrow ranges. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry, and we show that our model can explain changes in price levels and price dynamics after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture.
590 $a School code: 0117.
650 4 $a Sensitivity analysis. $3 3560752
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Trucks. $3 573590
650 4 $a Prices. $3 652651
650 4 $a Algorithms. $3 536374
653 $a Horizontal mergers
653 $a Welfare effects
653 $a Platform markets
653 $a Dynamic price competition
653 $a Asymmetric information
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0505
710 2 $a University of Maryland, College Park. $b Economics. $3 1030931
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
790 $a 0117
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28417476