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Uncertainty and Incomplete Contracts in Procurements.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Uncertainty and Incomplete Contracts in Procurements./
作者:	Yu, Zhechen.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	69 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03A.
標題:	Agreements. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28643877
ISBN:	9798535599052

Uncertainty and Incomplete Contracts in Procurements.
Yu, Zhechen.

Uncertainty and Incomplete Contracts in Procurements. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 69 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

When a buyer is uncertain whether a good/service design can fulfill the need of the purchase, the buyer is unable to write a complete contract, which may lead to a costly modification ex-post. In this paper, I study how the buyer's uncertainty affects the seller-selection process and contract price. The buyer tries to maximize his/her expected payoff by choosing a selection process and subsequently negotiating a price that accounts for the hold-up cost and the cost of modification. I gather a sample of federal service procurement contracts solicited through either a competitive or a non-competitive process with potential modifications observed ex-post. Empirically, to solve the endogenous selection issue, I adapt the Extended Roy Model with a predicted likelihood of modification. I find that, with less uncertainty or more market competition, it is more likely that the service will be procured through a competitive process. Moreover, ceteris paribus, when the uncertainty goes up, contract prices drop more in services procured through the non-competitive process than those procured through the competitive process.

ISBN: 9798535599052Subjects--Topical Terms:

3559354
Agreements.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Contract prices

Uncertainty and Incomplete Contracts in Procurements.
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