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Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry./
作者:	Craig, Stuart V.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	200 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03B.
標題:	Health care management. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28547837
ISBN:	9798535569550

Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry.
Craig, Stuart V.

Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 200 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies the economic forces that determine prices in business-to-business health care markets. Health care is a large fraction of the US economy. In US health care markets, consumers are often insured and interact with the health care system through intermediary decision makers (health care providers, insurers, and employers). Prices for the associated goods and services in these markets are typically negotiated in business-to-business transactions, which may have complicated implications for consumers. In this dissertation, I analyze pricing agreements across three vertical channels. First, I document large variation across insurers in the prices paid for the same medical services at the same hospital. This price variation, although difficult for consumers to observe, is driven at least in part by insurers' negotiating effort, and materially impacts the value of the insurance plan. Second, in a retrospective analysis of hospital mergers, I document relatively small cost savings, or ``efficiency'' gains post-merger. Where they do exist, cost reductions tend to be concentrated among high-tech implantable devices, and among hospitals for which market concentration in the output market is of the greatest concern. Finally, I study competition in the employer sponsored health insurance market. I estimate a model of supply and demand, which allows me to simulate the introduction of a potential publicly offered insurance plan, or public option, to the employer-sponsored market. I find that a public option has limited competitive impact on competition in the employer sponsored market under most policy scenarios, due to existing price discrimination and wide variation in the cost of providing insurance to different employer groups.

ISBN: 9798535569550Subjects--Topical Terms:

2122906
Health care management.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Competition

Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry.
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245 1 0 $a Vertical Contracting in the US Health Care Industry.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 200 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Grennan, Matthew.
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506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation studies the economic forces that determine prices in business-to-business health care markets. Health care is a large fraction of the US economy. In US health care markets, consumers are often insured and interact with the health care system through intermediary decision makers (health care providers, insurers, and employers). Prices for the associated goods and services in these markets are typically negotiated in business-to-business transactions, which may have complicated implications for consumers. In this dissertation, I analyze pricing agreements across three vertical channels. First, I document large variation across insurers in the prices paid for the same medical services at the same hospital. This price variation, although difficult for consumers to observe, is driven at least in part by insurers' negotiating effort, and materially impacts the value of the insurance plan. Second, in a retrospective analysis of hospital mergers, I document relatively small cost savings, or ``efficiency'' gains post-merger. Where they do exist, cost reductions tend to be concentrated among high-tech implantable devices, and among hospitals for which market concentration in the output market is of the greatest concern. Finally, I study competition in the employer sponsored health insurance market. I estimate a model of supply and demand, which allows me to simulate the introduction of a potential publicly offered insurance plan, or public option, to the employer-sponsored market. I find that a public option has limited competitive impact on competition in the employer sponsored market under most policy scenarios, due to existing price discrimination and wide variation in the cost of providing insurance to different employer groups.
590 $a School code: 0175.
650 4 $a Health care management. $3 2122906
650 4 $a Health care expenditures. $3 3433801
653 $a Competition
653 $a Dynamic oligopoly
653 $a Health care costs
653 $a Health insurance
653 $a Hospital prices
653 $a Price dispersion
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0769
710 2 $a University of Pennsylvania. $b Health Care Management & Economics. $3 3284071
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-03B.
790 $a 0175
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
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