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Information Sharing in the Online Marketplace when Competing Sellers Make to Stock or Incur Nonlinear Costs.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information Sharing in the Online Marketplace when Competing Sellers Make to Stock or Incur Nonlinear Costs./
作者:	Huang, Hu.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	79 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-09, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-09B.
標題:	Information dissemination. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29003142
ISBN:	9798209784791

Information Sharing in the Online Marketplace when Competing Sellers Make to Stock or Incur Nonlinear Costs.
Huang, Hu.

Information Sharing in the Online Marketplace when Competing Sellers Make to Stock or Incur Nonlinear Costs. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 79 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-09, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong), 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Online retailing is now an integral part of the modern economy. Platforms like Tmall and eBay, as key players in linking sellers/suppliers with consumers, are engines of the growth of online retail sales. This thesis investigates the incentives for and the effects of information sharing in the online platform where multiple sellers distribute their partially substitutable products.The first part of the thesis discusses information sharing in the online marketplace where the sellers make to order and incur non-linear costs. The analysis shows that the cost structure alone determines the direction of the impact of information sharing on revenue and cost, while the scope of information dissemination affects only the magnitude of that impact. The online platform has incentives to voluntarily share demand information with sellers if and only if the cost structure exhibits diseconomy, linearity, or moderate economy of scale. When the economy of scale is too large, sharing information with sellers will reduce the total revenue and thus the platform's earned commission. When sellers compete in quantity, the online platform shares information with fewer sellers if their products are more similar. The platform tends to share information with more sellers if they compete in price, as long as the cost structure has diseconomy or moderate economy of scale. The commission rate also impacts the platform's optimal scope of information sharing, depending on the cost structure. The platform's information sharing policy should be made based on the product category and the nature of seller competition. If the product category has a large economy of scale, the platform should not share information with any seller. Otherwise, the platform should share information with a subset of sellers if they compete in quantity, or with all sellers if they compete in price.The second part of the thesis discusses information sharing in the online marketplace when competing sellers make to stock. The online platform has a demand forecast and may choose to share it with the sellers in the stocking period. Differing from the usual Cournot competition, the selling quantities put up for sale in the selling season, when market demand realizes, are limited by, and may be smaller than, the stocking levels built up before the selling season when market demand is unknown without information from the platform. The analysis shows that the uninformed seller sets a higher stocking level than the informed seller does. However, the expected selling quantities (prices) of all sellers, informed or not, are the same and not affected by information sharing, equal to the equilibrium quantity (price) corresponding to the certainty-equivalent case. Information sharing benefits (hurts) the informed (uninformed) sellers by increasing (reducing) their revenue. The online platform tends to share information with fewer sellers when stocking is cheaper or the commission rate is lower. When the stocking cost is very low, sharing information reduces the total revenue and thus the platform's earned commission, then the platform has no incentive to share information. When voluntary information sharing is not possible, information sharing can be achieved through side payments because information sharing reduces the costs of all the sellers, informed or not, and the cost savings always dominate revenue loss.

ISBN: 9798209784791Subjects--Topical Terms:

3561048
Information dissemination.

Information Sharing in the Online Marketplace when Competing Sellers Make to Stock or Incur Nonlinear Costs.
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