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Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices./
作者:	Fan, Yiran.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	129 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28419703
ISBN:	9798516956447

Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices.
Fan, Yiran.

Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 129 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The ﬁrst chapter studies screening competition under ﬂexible information acquisition and its interaction with price competition. Multiple homogeneous buyers play a game where they simultaneously design independent exams with pre-speciﬁed information limit on a binary-type seller. Once observing own exam's outcome, a buyer may choose to bid for the object. This paper shows that under general assumptions on information cost, binary-signal symmetric equilibrium exists and must be supported by mixed strategies. Moreover, equilibrium is ineﬃcient and on average buyers over-reject the seller. Price regulation may help restore eﬃciency.The second chapter develops a dynamic general equilibrium model on the interaction of bankers' asset and liability management with liquidity concerns. Bankers screen real production projects and issue deposits. Liquidity concerns stem from endogenized early withdrawals of deposits. To fulﬁll early withdrawals, bankers sell assets in a secondary market. The paper argues that ex post asymmetric information in the secondary market distorts bankers' incentive in screening ex ante, as bad assets are easier to sell and generate liquidity beneﬁts. Moreover, the general equilibrium feature of the model implies that exogenous aggregate productivity shocks are ampliﬁed and booms may lead to busts.

ISBN: 9798516956447Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Adverse selection

Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on Financial Markets with Endogenous Information Screening Choices.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 129 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Hansen, Lars Peter;He, Zhiguo.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a The ﬁrst chapter studies screening competition under ﬂexible information acquisition and its interaction with price competition. Multiple homogeneous buyers play a game where they simultaneously design independent exams with pre-speciﬁed information limit on a binary-type seller. Once observing own exam's outcome, a buyer may choose to bid for the object. This paper shows that under general assumptions on information cost, binary-signal symmetric equilibrium exists and must be supported by mixed strategies. Moreover, equilibrium is ineﬃcient and on average buyers over-reject the seller. Price regulation may help restore eﬃciency.The second chapter develops a dynamic general equilibrium model on the interaction of bankers' asset and liability management with liquidity concerns. Bankers screen real production projects and issue deposits. Liquidity concerns stem from endogenized early withdrawals of deposits. To fulﬁll early withdrawals, bankers sell assets in a secondary market. The paper argues that ex post asymmetric information in the secondary market distorts bankers' incentive in screening ex ante, as bad assets are easier to sell and generate liquidity beneﬁts. Moreover, the general equilibrium feature of the model implies that exogenous aggregate productivity shocks are ampliﬁed and booms may lead to busts.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Accuracy. $3 3559958
650 4 $a Purchasing. $3 652497
650 4 $a Random variables. $3 646291
650 4 $a Inventors. $3 534219
650 4 $a Prices. $3 652651
650 4 $a Core curriculum. $3 3559991
650 4 $a Bids. $3 3561817
650 4 $a Competition. $3 537031
653 $a Adverse selection
653 $a Financial crises
653 $a Liquidity shocks
653 $a Macro-finance models
653 $a Project screening
653 $a Secondary market with lemons
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Business and Economics. $3 2098350
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
790 $a 0330
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28419703