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Essays on Matching Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Matching Markets./
作者:	Akin, Sumeyra.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	159 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-12A.
標題:	Education finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27743315
ISBN:	9798516082610

Essays on Matching Markets.
Akin, Sumeyra.

Essays on Matching Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 159 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies matching markets where monetary transfers are not possible. The goal is to provide a better understanding of how some of the well-known matching markets work.The first chapter studies matching markets that are subject to floor constraints. For example, in Turkey, the education ministry needs to guarantee a minimum number of teachers in each region of the country so that all students have access to education. Other prominent examples of markets having floor constraints are the Japanese medical residency matching market and the US cadet matching market. One obstacle in addressing important market design questions for these markets is that we lack a stability notion that accommodates floor constraints. This chapter aims to fill this gap and develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints.A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of teachers and schools that can propose a feasible alternative matching that is an improvement for its members. The critical element of this definition is the specification that a school can fire a teacher outside the coalition (as in the standard stability notion) but cannot reassign her to another school without her consent. This condition prevents a coalition from forcefully reassigning a teacher to a less-preferred school, and it is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable matching. I show that a floor respecting stable matching exists. I also provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for teachers and implements a floor respecting stable matching. The second chapter aims to understand what drives economic segregation in public schools. In the literature, the arguments for school segregation usually rely on the differences in students' preferences for schools or school priorities that are correlated with student wealth. In this chapter, I provide a novel rationale for public school segregation that does not rely on these arguments. I argue that one potential cause for segregation is the students' differences in their access to alternative schooling options outside the public school system, e.g., private schools. I highlight the role of alternative schooling options in public school segregation by studying the following problem. I study an allocation problem where students are assigned probability distributions over schools. Students differ in their outside options; that is, they differ in the utility that they obtain from remaining unassigned. All students have the same preferences over schools, and schools do not have any priorities. I examine the set of ex-ante Pareto efficient allocations in this environment. One of the key results in the chapter shows that ex-ante Pareto efficient allocations exhibit positive sorting property. That is, students with higher outside options are assigned to better schools. When we interpret outside options as a proxy for student income, this result suggests that one potential cause for economic segregation in public schools is the students' heterogeneity in their outside options. I also present empirical findings in the literature that are consistent with outside-option based explanation for segregation.The third chapter seeks to understand how the distribution of outside options affects students' preferences over the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance and the Boston mechanism. I study a model where students have common preferences for schools but differ in their outside options, and schools have no priorities. Students are either wealthy or poor, where wealthy students have a higher outside option. I find that wealthy students prefer the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance algorithm. In contrast, poor students prefer the deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the outside option of wealthy students is sufficiently high. These results suggest that the Boston mechanism may not Pareto dominate the deferred acceptance algorithm when there are asymmetries in students' outside options. Remarkably, when wealthy students have a sufficiently high outside option, the Boston mechanism may have multiple equilibria.

ISBN: 9798516082610Subjects--Topical Terms:

3172165
Education finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Matching market

Essays on Matching Markets.
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300 $a 159 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Samuelson, Larry.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation studies matching markets where monetary transfers are not possible. The goal is to provide a better understanding of how some of the well-known matching markets work.The first chapter studies matching markets that are subject to floor constraints. For example, in Turkey, the education ministry needs to guarantee a minimum number of teachers in each region of the country so that all students have access to education. Other prominent examples of markets having floor constraints are the Japanese medical residency matching market and the US cadet matching market. One obstacle in addressing important market design questions for these markets is that we lack a stability notion that accommodates floor constraints. This chapter aims to fill this gap and develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints.A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of teachers and schools that can propose a feasible alternative matching that is an improvement for its members. The critical element of this definition is the specification that a school can fire a teacher outside the coalition (as in the standard stability notion) but cannot reassign her to another school without her consent. This condition prevents a coalition from forcefully reassigning a teacher to a less-preferred school, and it is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable matching. I show that a floor respecting stable matching exists. I also provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for teachers and implements a floor respecting stable matching. The second chapter aims to understand what drives economic segregation in public schools. In the literature, the arguments for school segregation usually rely on the differences in students' preferences for schools or school priorities that are correlated with student wealth. In this chapter, I provide a novel rationale for public school segregation that does not rely on these arguments. I argue that one potential cause for segregation is the students' differences in their access to alternative schooling options outside the public school system, e.g., private schools. I highlight the role of alternative schooling options in public school segregation by studying the following problem. I study an allocation problem where students are assigned probability distributions over schools. Students differ in their outside options; that is, they differ in the utility that they obtain from remaining unassigned. All students have the same preferences over schools, and schools do not have any priorities. I examine the set of ex-ante Pareto efficient allocations in this environment. One of the key results in the chapter shows that ex-ante Pareto efficient allocations exhibit positive sorting property. That is, students with higher outside options are assigned to better schools. When we interpret outside options as a proxy for student income, this result suggests that one potential cause for economic segregation in public schools is the students' heterogeneity in their outside options. I also present empirical findings in the literature that are consistent with outside-option based explanation for segregation.The third chapter seeks to understand how the distribution of outside options affects students' preferences over the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance and the Boston mechanism. I study a model where students have common preferences for schools but differ in their outside options, and schools have no priorities. Students are either wealthy or poor, where wealthy students have a higher outside option. I find that wealthy students prefer the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance algorithm. In contrast, poor students prefer the deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the outside option of wealthy students is sufficiently high. These results suggest that the Boston mechanism may not Pareto dominate the deferred acceptance algorithm when there are asymmetries in students' outside options. Remarkably, when wealthy students have a sufficiently high outside option, the Boston mechanism may have multiple equilibria.
590 $a School code: 0265.
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650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
653 $a Matching market
653 $a Floor constraint
653 $a Economic segregation
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710 2 $a Yale University. $b Economics. $3 2093909
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 82-12A.
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
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