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A Virtue Theory of Art.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A Virtue Theory of Art./
作者:	Dengler, Christopher Ray.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	118 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-03B.
標題:	Aesthetics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28542828
ISBN:	9798538130894

A Virtue Theory of Art.
Dengler, Christopher Ray.

A Virtue Theory of Art. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 118 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-03, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

One plausible view would have it that the value of a work of art is to be found in the work itself - in its aesthetic properties - and that extraneous facts concerning the artist have no bearing on the evaluation of an artwork. Something like this idea underlies at least some of our aesthetic practices, for instance, when you see a painting, you form a judgment about it without inquiring any further into the identity of the author or facts about the author's goals and intentions. However, our practices have another aspect: we sometimes revise our initial judgments about the value of a work if we discover certain facts, for instance, that the work is a forgery or that it was generated by a computer program. Moreover, we consider ourselves quite justified in revising our judgments in this way. But why would facts about the identity of the author and the process by means of which a work comes about influence our judgments?The view on which the value of an artwork resides solely in its aesthetic properties cannot give us the answer. One can double-down, as some have, and argue that there really are significant aesthetic difference between, say, an original work and a forgery but that special training is required to notice those differences. But this view, in addition to being implausible on the face of it, cannot help explain why we feel entitled to change our judgment about the value of an artwork immediately upon discovering that it is a forgery, without being able to point to any aesthetic differences between said work and the original.My aim in this dissertation is to challenge the received view. I will argue that the artist - specifically their intent and artistic character - may legitimately influence the evaluation of their works. I will make a case for an account of the value of art based on artistic virtues, a view I call "the virtue theory of art". On this view, an artwork is good because it is one that would be produced by an artistically virtuous agent.The first chapter frames my account within the intentionalism/anti-intentionalism debate and motivates it in light of the issues other theories of art face in dealing with several problem cases - computer-generated art, forgers and forgeries, and great art made by morally bad artists, respectively. In the second, third, and fourth chapters, I address each of the three problem cases. I argue that art generated by computers and art made by forgers is of a lesser status than art made by non-forging, human artists, though for different reasons. In the case of great works made by artists who are immoral, I will argue that our best route is to disconnect artistic and ethical virtues. That is, one can be a morally depraved person, but that should not affect our appreciation of their artwork.

ISBN: 9798538130894Subjects--Topical Terms:

523036
Aesthetics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Aesthetics

A Virtue Theory of Art.
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