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Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy./
作者:	Di Gregorio, Enrico.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	202 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28498884
ISBN:	9798534680768

Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy.
Di Gregorio, Enrico.

Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 202 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of three essays in Public Finance and Political Economy dealing with business tax compliance in Italy and the management of natural gas infrastructures in the Greater Boston area.The first essay, co-authored with Matteo Paradisi, studies the potential role for audit rule disclosure in stimulating business tax compliance. To this end, we use administrative data from an Italian audit system known as Sector Studies. Sector Studies present small firms and the self-employed with relatively higher audit risks when reporting revenues below an idiosyncratic threshold that is revealed to the taxpayers. As a consequence, businesses respond by adjusting their reported revenues to bunch at these thresholds. Accordingly, we show in the data that bunching consistently correlates with measures of tax evasion. We thus estimate a structural model of business revenue underreporting to quantify the effect of disclosure. Relative to scenarios where audit risks are perceived to be constant, our calculations suggest that disclosure induces higher mean reported revenues without substantial welfare costs over the 2007-2010 period. We conclude that audit rule disclosure provides a relatively low-cost policy to reduce revenue underreporting even among the "hard-to-tax". The second essay investigates the effects of a 2011 reform to the Sector Studies. The policy, known as "reward regime", expanded the audit exemptions conferred to taxpayers complying with their Sector Study. While these rewards might induce a tax base rise among previously non-compliant filers, the provision of audit exemptions might still result in revenue losses on the net. Over the first six years of implementation, I show that the reform is associated with both higher mean reported revenues and gross profits in the affected sectors. These tax base gains are concentrated among taxpayers appearing non-compliant in the year before their sector's reform. The gradual roll-out of the reform also helps to illustrate the dynamics of bunching in a threshold-based, disclosed audit rule setting. Both taxpayers starting below and above their Sector Study revenue threshold before the reform reduce their distance to the threshold following the policy change. This evidence suggests that tax enforcement strategies relying on audit rule disclosure can engender both compliance-improving and -reducing behaviors, calling for close scrutiny of both individual and aggregate effects.The third essay, co-authored with Felipe Jordan Colzani, investigates the relationship between ethnic diversity and the reparation rate of natural gas leaks in Cambridge and Boston. Local diversity can reduce the ability of a community to protect its common resources by undermining collective action and an individual's attachment to the community. Using recent geocoded data on public-street gas leaks, we show that neighborhoods with higher ethno-racial and linguistic fractionalization enjoy a substantially lower share of reparations of the local leak pool. While more fractionalized communities in the data display lower levels of social capital and individual attachment, measures of the latter concepts fail to explain away our baseline correlations. Possible reasons for this puzzle may lie in the difficulty of isolating the complex social and political dynamics that connect a community to the overall state of its local infrastructure.

ISBN: 9798534680768Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Diversity

Essays in Public Finance and Political Economy.
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300 $a 202 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Stantcheva, Stefanie.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays in Public Finance and Political Economy dealing with business tax compliance in Italy and the management of natural gas infrastructures in the Greater Boston area.The first essay, co-authored with Matteo Paradisi, studies the potential role for audit rule disclosure in stimulating business tax compliance. To this end, we use administrative data from an Italian audit system known as Sector Studies. Sector Studies present small firms and the self-employed with relatively higher audit risks when reporting revenues below an idiosyncratic threshold that is revealed to the taxpayers. As a consequence, businesses respond by adjusting their reported revenues to bunch at these thresholds. Accordingly, we show in the data that bunching consistently correlates with measures of tax evasion. We thus estimate a structural model of business revenue underreporting to quantify the effect of disclosure. Relative to scenarios where audit risks are perceived to be constant, our calculations suggest that disclosure induces higher mean reported revenues without substantial welfare costs over the 2007-2010 period. We conclude that audit rule disclosure provides a relatively low-cost policy to reduce revenue underreporting even among the "hard-to-tax". The second essay investigates the effects of a 2011 reform to the Sector Studies. The policy, known as "reward regime", expanded the audit exemptions conferred to taxpayers complying with their Sector Study. While these rewards might induce a tax base rise among previously non-compliant filers, the provision of audit exemptions might still result in revenue losses on the net. Over the first six years of implementation, I show that the reform is associated with both higher mean reported revenues and gross profits in the affected sectors. These tax base gains are concentrated among taxpayers appearing non-compliant in the year before their sector's reform. The gradual roll-out of the reform also helps to illustrate the dynamics of bunching in a threshold-based, disclosed audit rule setting. Both taxpayers starting below and above their Sector Study revenue threshold before the reform reduce their distance to the threshold following the policy change. This evidence suggests that tax enforcement strategies relying on audit rule disclosure can engender both compliance-improving and -reducing behaviors, calling for close scrutiny of both individual and aggregate effects.The third essay, co-authored with Felipe Jordan Colzani, investigates the relationship between ethnic diversity and the reparation rate of natural gas leaks in Cambridge and Boston. Local diversity can reduce the ability of a community to protect its common resources by undermining collective action and an individual's attachment to the community. Using recent geocoded data on public-street gas leaks, we show that neighborhoods with higher ethno-racial and linguistic fractionalization enjoy a substantially lower share of reparations of the local leak pool. While more fractionalized communities in the data display lower levels of social capital and individual attachment, measures of the latter concepts fail to explain away our baseline correlations. Possible reasons for this puzzle may lie in the difficulty of isolating the complex social and political dynamics that connect a community to the overall state of its local infrastructure.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Social capital. $3 3564333
650 4 $a Estimates. $3 3561047
650 4 $a Reparations. $3 3686718
650 4 $a Gas leaks. $3 3686719
650 4 $a Natural gas. $3 668611
650 4 $a Essays. $3 642973
650 4 $a Multiculturalism & pluralism. $3 3558958
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653 $a Gas leaks
653 $a Political economy
653 $a Public finance
653 $a Tax compliance
653 $a Tax enforcement
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710 2 $a Harvard University. $b Political Economy and Government. $3 3171761
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
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