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Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building./
作者:	Grinberg, Marc Toby.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	329 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-06A.
標題:	Terrorism. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28812921
ISBN:	9798494453235

Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building.
Grinberg, Marc Toby.

Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 329 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In the hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush and his top aides frantically sought to prevent what was widely expected to be a wave of terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests around the world. Recognizing that the principles of deterrence, which had protected the United States since its birth, did not apply to suicidal terrorists, the national security apparatus began an unprecedented foreign-policy offensive that leveraged every element of statecraft. Borders and ports were effectively closed. The defense readiness condition was raised to DEFCON-3, mandating bombers and missile sites be ready to deploy on 15-minutes notice, elevated security at military bases and continuity-of-government protocols to protect the presidency. It was only the third time in history that the entire military was ordered to elevated readiness. Intelligence officials quickly identified Al Qaeda as the likely culprit and an ultimatum was delivered to the Taliban government: turn over Al Qaeda leadership and shut down its infrastructure or the U.S. would do whatever it thought necessary to prevent Al Qaeda from launching future attacks. Anticipating that the Taliban would balk at U.S. demands, Defense Department officials drew up plans for military operations. The CIA was given new legal authorities to conduct covert operations in Afghanistan. To support U.S. threats and likely military action, the State Department organized a broad coalition to enhance the legitimacy of America's response and provide material support. The Treasury began taking steps to starve Al Qaeda of financial resources.The threat confronting the U.S., though, was unlike any it had experienced or prepared to fight. Al Qaeda did not hold territory, have populations to serve or wear uniforms. There were formal group members, largely in Afghanistan, but also an unknown number of ideological adherents and financial supporters integrated into civilian society across the globe. And Al Qaeda was only one of a set of adversarial state and non-state actors that used terrorism as an instrument of political violence. It would be hard to overstate how fearful U.S. officials were that an opportunistic adversary would provide Al Qaeda or another terrorist group with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Americans saw themselves as under attack from what was, essentially, a global network of individuals with the potential to create destruction on the scale of which only a few nation states were capable. As the distributed and decentralized nature of the terrorist threat became clear, the Bush Administration concluded that this was not a problem the U.S. could solve on its own. Countries in which terrorist groups operated would need to destroy their training camps and arrest their members. Neighboring states would need to secure their borders to prevent the threat from simply moving. And governments around the world would need to shut off the flow of resources from financial supporters, protect critical infrastructure and take steps to ensure ideological supporters did not form new groups or launch lone-wolf attacks. "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make," President Bush declared to a joint session of Congress just ten days after the attacks, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Counterterrorism quickly became the focal point of most of America's bilateral relationships.

ISBN: 9798494453235Subjects--Topical Terms:

569041
Terrorism.

Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building.
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