東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics./
作者:	Kapon, Samuel D.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	184 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02B.
標題:	Law enforcement. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28322041
ISBN:	9798534676655

Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics.
Kapon, Samuel D.

Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 184 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this dissertation, I examine three problems related to mechanism design and experimental economics.In the first chapter, I consider an environment in which a regulator faces a stream of agents each engaged in crime with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of penalty reductions for criminals who self-report before they are detected. In an optimal time path, the intertemporal variation in the returns from crime can generate intertemporal variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, at which point the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime self-report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime self-report always. I discuss applications to desertion during war, illegal gun ownership, and tax evasion.In the second chapter, which is joint with Sylvain Chassang and Lucia Del Carpio, we examine a setting in which a government is limited in its capacity to enforce laws, which can result in multiple equilibria. If most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade isolated agents from misbehaving. If most agents do not comply, overstretched enforcement capacity has a minimal impact on behavior. We study the extent to which divide-and-conquer enforcement strategies can help select a high compliance equilibrium in the presence of realistic compliance frictions. We study the role of information about the compliance of others both in theory and in lab experiments. As the number of agents gets large, theory indicates that providing information or not is irrelevant in equilibrium. In contrast, providing individualized information has a first order impact in experimental play by increasing convergence to equilibrium. This illustrates the value of out-of-equilibrium information design. In the third chapter, which is joint with Sylvain Chassang, we study a problem in which a principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail-free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the performance of the pivot VCG mechanism using limited liability detail-free mechanisms that selectively ignore reports from participants who cannot make their promised payments. A complementary use of cautiousness and forgiveness achieves approximate renegotiation-proofness. We emphasize the use of prior-free online optimization techniques to approximate aggregate incentive properties of the pivot mechanism.

ISBN: 9798534676655Subjects--Topical Terms:

607408
Law enforcement.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Amnesty

Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics.
LDR:04078nmm a2200373 4500 001 2343994
005 20220513115343.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798534676655
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28322041
035 $a AAI28322041
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kapon, Samuel D. $3 3682675
245 1 0 $a Essays in Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 184 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Chassang, Sylvain;Frechette, Guillaume.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a In this dissertation, I examine three problems related to mechanism design and experimental economics.In the first chapter, I consider an environment in which a regulator faces a stream of agents each engaged in crime with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of penalty reductions for criminals who self-report before they are detected. In an optimal time path, the intertemporal variation in the returns from crime can generate intertemporal variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, at which point the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime self-report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime self-report always. I discuss applications to desertion during war, illegal gun ownership, and tax evasion.In the second chapter, which is joint with Sylvain Chassang and Lucia Del Carpio, we examine a setting in which a government is limited in its capacity to enforce laws, which can result in multiple equilibria. If most agents comply, limited enforcement is sufficient to dissuade isolated agents from misbehaving. If most agents do not comply, overstretched enforcement capacity has a minimal impact on behavior. We study the extent to which divide-and-conquer enforcement strategies can help select a high compliance equilibrium in the presence of realistic compliance frictions. We study the role of information about the compliance of others both in theory and in lab experiments. As the number of agents gets large, theory indicates that providing information or not is irrelevant in equilibrium. In contrast, providing individualized information has a first order impact in experimental play by increasing convergence to equilibrium. This illustrates the value of out-of-equilibrium information design. In the third chapter, which is joint with Sylvain Chassang, we study a problem in which a principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail-free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the performance of the pivot VCG mechanism using limited liability detail-free mechanisms that selectively ignore reports from participants who cannot make their promised payments. A complementary use of cautiousness and forgiveness achieves approximate renegotiation-proofness. We emphasize the use of prior-free online optimization techniques to approximate aggregate incentive properties of the pivot mechanism.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Law enforcement. $3 607408
650 4 $a Behavioral sciences. $3 529833
650 4 $a Crime. $3 610156
650 4 $a Fines & penalties. $3 3560680
650 4 $a Criminals. $3 1090905
650 4 $a Calendars. $3 879487
650 4 $a Amnesties. $3 3682676
653 $a Amnesty
653 $a Regulation
653 $a Information design
653 $a Dynamic allocation
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0602
690 $a 0206
710 2 $a New York University. $b Economics. $3 1032403
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02B.
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28322041