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Essays on Information Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information Economics./
作者:	Ferreira Onuchic, Paula.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	189 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Information science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28323768
ISBN:	9798534690194

Essays on Information Economics.
Ferreira Onuchic, Paula.

Essays on Information Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 189 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies three questions in information economics. In each case, I consider environments where some agents, such as financial advisors or well-connected traders, have access to privileged information. In the first two essays, I study strategic communication between advisors and information receivers, and the implications of interest misalignment between the two groups of agents. In the third essay, I study how some traders use privileged information to shape their trading behavior, and the implications of such behavior for the overall market structure.In the first chapter, a sender acquires a signal about the quality of an object and commits to a rule to disclose its realizations to a receiver, who then chooses to buy the object or to keep an outside option of privately known value. Optimal disclosure rules typically conceal negative signal realizations when the object's sale is very profitable to the sender and positive signal realizations when the sale is less profitable. Using such disclosure rules, the advisor is able to steer sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I show that, despite this strategic concealment of some signal realizations, the receiver may prefer to be informed by a non-transparent sender, because such hidden motives produce an additional incentive for the sender to invest in acquiring a precise signal of the object's quality. I use my model to evaluate policies commonly proposed in the context of financial advisors, such as mandatory disclosure of commissions and commission caps. In the second chapter, joint work with Debraj Ray, a sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. I characterize the sender's optimal monotonic categorization. Using this characterization, I study the optimality of full pooling or full separation, the alternation of pooling and separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. I discuss applications, extensions and generalizations, among them the design of a grading scheme by a profit-maximizing school which seeks to signal student qualities and simultaneously incentivize students to learn. Such incentive constraints force monotonicity, and can also be embedded as a distortion of the school's prior over student qualities, generating a categorization problem with distinct sender and receiver priors.Finally, in the third chapter, I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishment traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishment strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.

ISBN: 9798534690194Subjects--Topical Terms:

554358
Information science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Information design

Essays on Information Economics.
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520 $a This dissertation studies three questions in information economics. In each case, I consider environments where some agents, such as financial advisors or well-connected traders, have access to privileged information. In the first two essays, I study strategic communication between advisors and information receivers, and the implications of interest misalignment between the two groups of agents. In the third essay, I study how some traders use privileged information to shape their trading behavior, and the implications of such behavior for the overall market structure.In the first chapter, a sender acquires a signal about the quality of an object and commits to a rule to disclose its realizations to a receiver, who then chooses to buy the object or to keep an outside option of privately known value. Optimal disclosure rules typically conceal negative signal realizations when the object's sale is very profitable to the sender and positive signal realizations when the sale is less profitable. Using such disclosure rules, the advisor is able to steer sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I show that, despite this strategic concealment of some signal realizations, the receiver may prefer to be informed by a non-transparent sender, because such hidden motives produce an additional incentive for the sender to invest in acquiring a precise signal of the object's quality. I use my model to evaluate policies commonly proposed in the context of financial advisors, such as mandatory disclosure of commissions and commission caps. In the second chapter, joint work with Debraj Ray, a sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. I characterize the sender's optimal monotonic categorization. Using this characterization, I study the optimality of full pooling or full separation, the alternation of pooling and separation, and make precise a sense in which pooling is dominant relative to separation. I discuss applications, extensions and generalizations, among them the design of a grading scheme by a profit-maximizing school which seeks to signal student qualities and simultaneously incentivize students to learn. Such incentive constraints force monotonicity, and can also be embedded as a distortion of the school's prior over student qualities, generating a categorization problem with distinct sender and receiver priors.Finally, in the third chapter, I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishment traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishment strategies that yield informed agents either more effective opportunities to trade or the ability to extract more surplus in trades.
590 $a School code: 0146.
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650 4 $a Corruption. $3 615175
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Dissertations & theses. $3 3560115
650 4 $a Financial planners. $3 668980
650 4 $a Advisors. $3 3560734
650 4 $a Bias. $2 gtt $3 1374837
650 4 $a Graphic arts. $3 523588
650 4 $a Maps. $3 544078
650 4 $a Brokers. $3 683170
650 4 $a Design. $3 518875
650 4 $a Probability. $3 518898
650 4 $a Expected values. $3 3563993
653 $a Information design
653 $a Information economics
653 $a Intermediation
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