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Epistemic responsibility for undesir...

Heikes, Deborah K.

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Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs/ by Deborah K. Heikes.
作者:	Heikes, Deborah K.
出版者:	Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland : : 2023.,
面頁冊數:	viii, 233 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	1. Epistemic Responsibility: An Overview -- 2. What Is Undesirable Belief? -- 3. Can There Be Epistemic Responsibility? -- 4. What About the Exculpatory Effects of Ignorance? -- 5. It's Not My Fault.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41858-7
ISBN:	9783031418587

Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs
Heikes, Deborah K.

Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs[electronic resource] /by Deborah K. Heikes. - Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :2023. - viii, 233 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Epistemic Responsibility: An Overview -- 2. What Is Undesirable Belief? -- 3. Can There Be Epistemic Responsibility? -- 4. What About the Exculpatory Effects of Ignorance? -- 5. It's Not My Fault.

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an "undesirable belief" will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. Deborah K. Heikes is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

ISBN: 9783031418587

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-41858-7doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

564681
Ignorance (Theory of knowledge)

LC Class. No.: BD221

Dewey Class. No.: 121

Epistemic responsibility for undesirable beliefs
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