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Studies in no-self physicalism

Ye, Feng.

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Studies in no-self physicalism

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Studies in no-self physicalism/ by Feng Ye.
作者:	Ye, Feng.
出版者:	Singapore :Springer Nature Singapore : : 2023.,
面頁冊數:	xiii, 568 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Introduction: Steps toward No-Self Physicalism -- The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others -- Concepts and Conceptual Representation -- Thoughts and Truth -- Mathematical Concepts and Thoughts -- Epistemology and Methodology -- A Physicalistic Ontology -- A Physicalistic Characterization of No-Self Physicalism -- Conclusions -- Index.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Philosophy of mind. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8143-2
ISBN:	9789811981432

Studies in no-self physicalism
Ye, Feng.

Studies in no-self physicalism[electronic resource] /by Feng Ye. - Singapore :Springer Nature Singapore :2023. - xiii, 568 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Introduction: Steps toward No-Self Physicalism -- The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others -- Concepts and Conceptual Representation -- Thoughts and Truth -- Mathematical Concepts and Thoughts -- Epistemology and Methodology -- A Physicalistic Ontology -- A Physicalistic Characterization of No-Self Physicalism -- Conclusions -- Index.

This book demonstrates how a radical version of physicalism ('No-Self Physicalism') can offer an internally coherent and comprehensive philosophical worldview. It first argues that a coherent physicalist should explicitly treat a cognitive subject merely as a physical thing and should not vaguely assume an amorphous or even soul-like subject or self. This approach forces the physicalist to re-examine traditional core philosophical notions such as truth, analyticity, modality, apriority because our traditional understandings of them appear to be predicated on a cognitive subject that is not literally just a physical thing. In turn, working on the assumption that a cognitive subject is itself completely physical, namely a neural network-based robot programmed by evolution (hence the term 'No-Self'), the book proposes physicalistic theories on conceptual representation, truth, analyticity, modality, the nature of mathematics, epistemic justification, knowledge, apriority and intuition, as well as a physicalistic ontology. These are meant to show that this No-Self Physicalism, perhaps the most minimalistic and radical version of physicalism proposed to date, can accommodate many aspects that have traditionally interested philosophers. Given its refreshingly radical approach and painstakingly developed content, the book is of interest to anyone who is seeking a coherent philosophical worldview in this age of science.

ISBN: 9789811981432

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-19-8143-2doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

526007
Philosophy of mind.

LC Class. No.: BD418.3

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

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520 $a This book demonstrates how a radical version of physicalism ('No-Self Physicalism') can offer an internally coherent and comprehensive philosophical worldview. It first argues that a coherent physicalist should explicitly treat a cognitive subject merely as a physical thing and should not vaguely assume an amorphous or even soul-like subject or self. This approach forces the physicalist to re-examine traditional core philosophical notions such as truth, analyticity, modality, apriority because our traditional understandings of them appear to be predicated on a cognitive subject that is not literally just a physical thing. In turn, working on the assumption that a cognitive subject is itself completely physical, namely a neural network-based robot programmed by evolution (hence the term 'No-Self'), the book proposes physicalistic theories on conceptual representation, truth, analyticity, modality, the nature of mathematics, epistemic justification, knowledge, apriority and intuition, as well as a physicalistic ontology. These are meant to show that this No-Self Physicalism, perhaps the most minimalistic and radical version of physicalism proposed to date, can accommodate many aspects that have traditionally interested philosophers. Given its refreshingly radical approach and painstakingly developed content, the book is of interest to anyone who is seeking a coherent philosophical worldview in this age of science.
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