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VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF O...

TACHAU, KATHERINE HUTCHINS.

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VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM./
作者:	TACHAU, KATHERINE HUTCHINS.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1981,
面頁冊數:	390 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 42-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International42-07A.
標題:	Middle Ages. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8117542
ISBN:	9798661845832

VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM.
TACHAU, KATHERINE HUTCHINS.

VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1981 - 390 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 42-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1981.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

When William of Ockham lectured on Peter Lombard's Sentences between 1317-1318, he articulated a new theory of knowledge. Intellectual historians have increasingly come to regard his as a significant achievement, especially because he eliminated unwarranted mediators from cognition. It has therefore seemed obvious that a coterie of "Ockhamists," if not most influential thinkers of the fourteenth century, adopted Ockham's notion of intuitive and abstractive cognition, and eliminated sensible and intelligible species as he had. The present work argues that this did not in fact occur. Instead, Ockham's theory of knowledge elicited an instant and prolonged negative response. In order to understand why this was so, the study begins with a discussion of the perspectivist theory of knowledge that, by eliminating species, Ockham attempted to replace. That theory was formulated most systematically by scholars concerned primarily with optics and psychological operations based upon vision. Of these "perspectivists," Roger Bacon was most responsible for elaborating an account of light's action, vision, and semantics based upon the causal action of the "multiplication of species." Bacon's theory was not without its difficulties, however, and attempts to refine it preceded Ockham. After examining Henry of Ghent's and Peter John Olivi's objections to the theory, the first chapter concludes by reviewing John Duns Scotus' epistemology. Accepting the Baconian theory, Scotus appended to it an additional mode of cognition which he termed "intuitive," to establish direct contact with perceived objects. Far from posing a threat to naturally achieved existential certainty, as some modern readers have supposed, this mode of cognition was adduced to assure such certitude. Although Scotus' description of the dichotomy of abstractive and intuitive cognition invited interpretation, it nevertheless served as the foundation for all subsequent fourteenth-century epistemological theories. Of the principal interpretations advanced in the opening decades of the century, the most controversial--those of Peter Aureol (chapter II) and William of Ockham (chapter III)--departed significantly from Scotus. Beginning with Chatton, Aureol's English readers rejected his theory as unable to guarantee existential certainty. After explicating Ockham's own theory, the study focuses on those who read his Sentences commentary in England during the next decade. In addition to examining the positions of Reading and Chatton (chapter IV), whom recent scholars have correctly identified as Ockham's early opponents, the remainder of the dissertation analyzes the writings of Ockham's alleged followers at Oxford: Rodington, FitzRalph, Holcot, Crathorn, and Wodeham. None accepted Ockham's theory. Wodeham's rejection of his teacher's epistemological positions is particularly significant, as Wodeham has long been considered Ockham's most ardent defender. Instead, Wodeham approved many of Chatton's criticisms and, with his contemporaries, objected on cogent grounds to Ockham's elimination of species and modifications of Scotus' theory. Wodeham's colleagues, moreover, tended to adopt as their interpretation of Scotus the understanding offered by Ockham's all-but-forgotten contemporary, Campsall. There is no evidence that any of these authors was swayed to reject Ockham's stance by Lutterell's efforts to achieve its condemnation at Avignon. Nor is any charge of skepticism leveled at this generation justified. In defending the account of cognition that endured well beyond the bounds of the century, Ockham's early critics established what remained the majority opinion. As many of the developments in fourteenth-century science and thought are assumed to have been stimulated by Ockham, his failure to gain a following for a theory in which he innovated so greatly urges reassessment of that assumption.

ISBN: 9798661845832Subjects--Topical Terms:

568537
Middle Ages.

VISION AND CERTITUDE IN THE AGE OF OCKHAM.
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