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Truth-Aimed Epistemology.

Marxen, Chad.

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Truth-Aimed Epistemology.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Truth-Aimed Epistemology./
作者:	Marxen, Chad.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	83 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-01A.
標題:	Consequentialism. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28727130
ISBN:	9798534694338

Truth-Aimed Epistemology.
Marxen, Chad.

Truth-Aimed Epistemology. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 83 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

There are many propositions for which it's epistemically rational for us to be confident in (or believe) them. If we're confident in exactly these propositions, these doxastic attitudes will be accurate in general. This much is clear. What's much less clear is how we should understand the nature of this connection between rationality and truth or accuracy (i.e. the Truth Connection). To draw insights on this matter, the dissertation begins by considering a prominent account of the Truth Connection, and then poses a couple of problems for it. One of these problems is centered on an interesting case where an agent has evidence that (1) makes it not likely overall that a certain proposition is true, but (2) makes it likely that the proposition will be true on the condition that she comes to be confident in (or believe) it. Call this case a self-fulfilling case. After reflecting on the source of this problem for the theory, the dissertation makes further use of self-fulfilling cases to better understand the Truth Connection; the dissertation identifies rationality's roles and then applies them to these cases. One of these roles is being-in a certain sense-actionable. To illustrate, if it's epistemically rational to believe that it will rain and it's practically rational to take an umbrella to work on the condition that it will (probably) rain, then it must be practically rational full stop to take an umbrella to work. Another one of these roles is being sensitive to logic. Thus, for example, since it's obvious that the proposition that it will rain logically implies that it will rain or snow, if it's rational to believe that it will rain, then it must also be rational to believe that it will rain or snow. Appealing to these roles, the dissertation advances a thesis I call 'truth-aimed epistemology': rationality fundamentally guides us to believe the propositions that are likely to be true (independent of whether we believe them) and not towards the propositions that are likely to be true if we believe them. Put briefly, rationality is a guide to true propositions rather than true beliefs.

ISBN: 9798534694338Subjects--Topical Terms:

3564195
Consequentialism.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Rationality

Truth-Aimed Epistemology.
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520 $a There are many propositions for which it's epistemically rational for us to be confident in (or believe) them. If we're confident in exactly these propositions, these doxastic attitudes will be accurate in general. This much is clear. What's much less clear is how we should understand the nature of this connection between rationality and truth or accuracy (i.e. the Truth Connection). To draw insights on this matter, the dissertation begins by considering a prominent account of the Truth Connection, and then poses a couple of problems for it. One of these problems is centered on an interesting case where an agent has evidence that (1) makes it not likely overall that a certain proposition is true, but (2) makes it likely that the proposition will be true on the condition that she comes to be confident in (or believe) it. Call this case a self-fulfilling case. After reflecting on the source of this problem for the theory, the dissertation makes further use of self-fulfilling cases to better understand the Truth Connection; the dissertation identifies rationality's roles and then applies them to these cases. One of these roles is being-in a certain sense-actionable. To illustrate, if it's epistemically rational to believe that it will rain and it's practically rational to take an umbrella to work on the condition that it will (probably) rain, then it must be practically rational full stop to take an umbrella to work. Another one of these roles is being sensitive to logic. Thus, for example, since it's obvious that the proposition that it will rain logically implies that it will rain or snow, if it's rational to believe that it will rain, then it must also be rational to believe that it will rain or snow. Appealing to these roles, the dissertation advances a thesis I call 'truth-aimed epistemology': rationality fundamentally guides us to believe the propositions that are likely to be true (independent of whether we believe them) and not towards the propositions that are likely to be true if we believe them. Put briefly, rationality is a guide to true propositions rather than true beliefs.
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