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The Nature of Union in Love.

Nebel, Jonathan.

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The Nature of Union in Love.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Nature of Union in Love./
作者:	Nebel, Jonathan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	183 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28410828
ISBN:	9798516911736

The Nature of Union in Love.
Nebel, Jonathan.

The Nature of Union in Love. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 183 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Saint Louis University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In the philosophical literature on the nature of love, the most common objection to the view that love involves a union between those in love has been that there is no coherent way to explain what that union is. There have been numerous attempts to respond to this objection by providing an account of what that union is, but they all provide an account that focuses on the psychology of those in love at the expense of the metaphysics. My dissertation provides a robustly metaphysical account of the union between those in love.To provide that account, I turn to the growing literature on the self. I use Dan Zahavi's conception of the experiential self and Marya Schechtman's conception of the narrative self as the basis of my own. I offer some novel arguments to defend the existence of each of these selves and to oppose Buddhist criticisms of Zahavi and Galen Strawson's criticisms of Schechtman. Rather than trying to adjudicate between the two conceptions of the self, I argue that the self is a multiplicity and that they both describe some aspect of the self. With this understanding of the self, I can show how persons in love can be united in their narrative selves while being distinct individuals in their experiential selves. In chapter one, I begin with Aquinas' account of love. I walk through a series of possible unity relations and find them all incapable of getting at the type of union we desire. I conclude by outlining four desiderata for an account of union between persons in love. The account must explain: (a) how the persons in union continue to be individual persons, (b) how the persons in union come to be unified, (c) how the persons can be both distinct and unified at the same time, and (d) how union can come in degrees.In chapter two, I examine three accounts of union in love from Robert Nozick, Robert Solomon, and Eleonore Stump. I find all three of these accounts to be helpful, but they are incomplete. They provide an account of a psychological type of unity, but fail to get at something more metaphysically robust about that union.In chapter three, I develop my account of the self. I present and defend Zahavi's experiential self and Schechtman's narrative self and argue that the self is a multiplicity, which means that both the experiential self and the narrative self capture at least some part of each of our own selves. I present two arguments based on modern psychology for thinking this multiplicity must be accepted. In chapter four, I seek to capture the desiderata with my account of the self. I can explain (a) with the experiential self. Even in the most intimate union, one cannot share their experiential self, as it involves the most basic form of for-me-ness. I can explain (b) with the narrative self. When persons come into union in love, they co-write each other's narratives, such that their narratives self become united. I can explain (c) with the multiplicity of the self. Persons in love can be unified qua their narrative selves, but be distinct qua their experiential selves. Importantly, both of those things can be true simultaneously. Finally, I can explain (d) by showing how two narratives can be more or less united.

ISBN: 9798516911736Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Experiential self

The Nature of Union in Love.
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