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An Extension of Social Justice: A Ra...

Tillman, Jennifer Christina.

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An Extension of Social Justice: A Rawlsian Application of Justice for the Intellectually Disabled.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	An Extension of Social Justice: A Rawlsian Application of Justice for the Intellectually Disabled./
作者:	Tillman, Jennifer Christina.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	188 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-06B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28157608
ISBN:	9798698579120

An Extension of Social Justice: A Rawlsian Application of Justice for the Intellectually Disabled.
Tillman, Jennifer Christina.

An Extension of Social Justice: A Rawlsian Application of Justice for the Intellectually Disabled. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 188 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Albany, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this dissertation, I add to the literature in the following way. First, I review the existing criticisms of Rawls's theory of justice, which claims that he is unable to address the question of justice for individuals with intellectual disabilities. Second, I explain how Rawls's idea of reciprocity can accommodate some forms of disability but not the more severe cases. Third, I develop an account of a right to political identity that can provide an extension of Rawls's theory to address the more severe cases of disability. From these steps, I will suggest that these changes will allow us to address the problem of institutionalized stigma that individuals with intellectual disabilities often experience. Segregating, creating negative stereotypes, and discouraging persons with intellectual disabilities from being a part of the political process are core violations of their right to a political identity.The first chapter outlines Rawls's basic project. Primarily, I focus on the role of reciprocity and the model that Rawls develops for the two principles of justice. By the end of chapter one, I raise questions regarding the extension of this model in cases that Rawls himself did not discuss. Chapter 2 identifies ways in which Rawls's theory has been extended to non-standard cases. This chapter introduces Norman Daniels's extension of Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity. I raise two objections against Daniels's extension: first, Daniels's extension of the principle of fair equality of opportunity does not provide an adequate solution for individuals who are never capable of reciprocity, and, second, I object to Daniels's conception of the person because it relies on the biomedical model of disability.Chapter 3 focuses on cases of disability which are generally excluded from Rawls's and Daniels's discussion. By exclusion, I mean that Rawls and Daniels do not discuss these cases. Further, exclusion can also mean that Daniels and Rawls do not discuss these cases because these cases are outside of the scope of political justice. However, I will argue that some cases of disability are inside the scope of political justice. To show this, there are two general goals in chapter 3. First, I develop an appropriate extension of paternalism that could be compatible with Rawls's conception of reciprocity. Second, I distinguish Rawls's conception of reciprocity from other conceptions of reciprocity, namely G.A. Cohen and David Gauthier. Chapter 4 focuses on cases of disability that were traditionally thought to be excluded from a Rawlsian conception of reciprocity, i.e. persons with mild forms of schizophrenia. To develop this argument, I highlight Rawls's political conception of the person. With this political conception, I develop an extension of Rawls's model of the person to these cases of disability.The contribution these arguments make to the issue of disability and distributive justice is to extend Rawls's view to be more inclusive of persons with disabilities. Supporting a Rawlsian view of distributive justice does not mean that we can treat persons with physical and mental impairments with cruelty, indifference or ignore them as recipients of justice. Persons with physical and mental impairments also have basic rights and liberties that ought to be protected and part of my project is to show how this can be a part of a Rawlsian view.

ISBN: 9798698579120Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Mental impairments

An Extension of Social Justice: A Rawlsian Application of Justice for the Intellectually Disabled.
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