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Actions and Causes: A Methodological...

Fritts, Megan.

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Actions and Causes: A Methodological Inquiry into the Explanation of Action.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Actions and Causes: A Methodological Inquiry into the Explanation of Action./
作者:	Fritts, Megan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	141 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-06A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28260590
ISBN:	9798557000932

Actions and Causes: A Methodological Inquiry into the Explanation of Action.
Fritts, Megan.

Actions and Causes: A Methodological Inquiry into the Explanation of Action. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 141 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The Causal Theory of Action (CTA) holds that when we explain actions, we cite mental states as both the reasons for the actions and the causes of those actions. Competing theories hold that the reasons we cite in action explanations are not, within these explanations, explaining the actions by citing a cause, but rather by revealing something about the agent herself. Because of the relative opacity of most non-causal theories of action explanation, these theories have become far less popular than the CTA. Recently, the debate has ground to a halt; the CTA, despite some persistent problems, has become the standard theory, in part because of a lack of robust non-causal accounts. My dissertation outlines the key points of this debate, especially those on which discussion has become unproductive, and aims to provide a new way forward. I begin by identifying two desiderata that action theorists generally want from a theory of action explanation. I then argue, in chapter two, that at least one desideratum is not met by the CTA. In chapter three I propose my own non-causal theory of action explanation and argue that this theory performs just as well as the CTA. The fourth chapter of this dissertation proposes a new desideratum for theories of action explanation and advances an argument against the CTA theory based on this new desideratum. The final chapter seeks to historically orient the reader in order to show that the CTA benefits from what I call "borrowed plausibility"-that is, the CTA appears very intuitive in virtue of a prominent, generally mechanistic, worldview. This chapter concludes by suggesting a new way forward for the CTA research program: a shift from action theorizing to action modeling.

ISBN: 9798557000932Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Action theory

Actions and Causes: A Methodological Inquiry into the Explanation of Action.
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