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Essays in Behavioral Information Eco...

Ostrizek, Franz Peter.

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Essays in Behavioral Information Economics: Overconfidence, Sophistication, Naivete.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Behavioral Information Economics: Overconfidence, Sophistication, Naivete./
作者:	Ostrizek, Franz Peter.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	182 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-01A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28021756
ISBN:	9798662419834

Essays in Behavioral Information Economics: Overconfidence, Sophistication, Naivete.
Ostrizek, Franz Peter.

Essays in Behavioral Information Economics: Overconfidence, Sophistication, Naivete. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 182 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This Dissertation comprises three chapters reconsidering questions of information economics in light of behavioral biases exhibited by workers and consumers. In the first chapter, I analyze how firms design feedback and bonuses when workers are uncertain or even misguided about their own ability. I analyze a dynamic principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about the importance of effort. More precise performance evaluation reduces current agency costs but promotes learning, which is shown to increase future agency costs. The optimal evaluation technology is both imprecise and tough: a bad performance is always sanctioned, but a good one is not always recognized. We also study the case in which the agent has incorrect beliefs about his abilities. If the agent is overconfident, the principal uses a tough evaluation structure to preserve the agent's profitable misperception.In the second chapter, joint with Denis Shishkin, we analyze screening with frame-dependent valuations. A monopolist principal designs an extensive-form decision problem with frames at each stage. This allows the firm to induce dynamic inconsistency and thereby reduce information rents. The optimal extensive form has a simple three-stage structure and uses only the two highest frames (high-low-high). Some types buy in the first stage, others buy at the last stage. Sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate that if they deviated, they would choose a decoy, which they want to avoid in a lower frame. This eliminates incentive compatibility constraints into types who don't buy in the first stage. With naive consumers, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.In the third chapter, I consider a market where some consumers neglect follow-up fees. Why would firms increase price transparency towards such naive consumers? We show that exploiting consumer naivete decreases profits if naifs are more price sensitive than sophisticates. Firms desire to be transparent towards the marginal consumer, thereby increasing the equilibrium price, while leaving their own captured consumers in the dark. Increased transparency is most valuable to consumers when firms have the least incentives to engage in it, can increase aggregate welfare, but typically redistributes surplus from consumers to firms.

ISBN: 9798662419834Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Behavioral economics

Essays in Behavioral Information Economics: Overconfidence, Sophistication, Naivete.
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520 $a This Dissertation comprises three chapters reconsidering questions of information economics in light of behavioral biases exhibited by workers and consumers. In the first chapter, I analyze how firms design feedback and bonuses when workers are uncertain or even misguided about their own ability. I analyze a dynamic principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about the importance of effort. More precise performance evaluation reduces current agency costs but promotes learning, which is shown to increase future agency costs. The optimal evaluation technology is both imprecise and tough: a bad performance is always sanctioned, but a good one is not always recognized. We also study the case in which the agent has incorrect beliefs about his abilities. If the agent is overconfident, the principal uses a tough evaluation structure to preserve the agent's profitable misperception.In the second chapter, joint with Denis Shishkin, we analyze screening with frame-dependent valuations. A monopolist principal designs an extensive-form decision problem with frames at each stage. This allows the firm to induce dynamic inconsistency and thereby reduce information rents. The optimal extensive form has a simple three-stage structure and uses only the two highest frames (high-low-high). Some types buy in the first stage, others buy at the last stage. Sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate that if they deviated, they would choose a decoy, which they want to avoid in a lower frame. This eliminates incentive compatibility constraints into types who don't buy in the first stage. With naive consumers, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.In the third chapter, I consider a market where some consumers neglect follow-up fees. Why would firms increase price transparency towards such naive consumers? We show that exploiting consumer naivete decreases profits if naifs are more price sensitive than sophisticates. Firms desire to be transparent towards the marginal consumer, thereby increasing the equilibrium price, while leaving their own captured consumers in the dark. Increased transparency is most valuable to consumers when firms have the least incentives to engage in it, can increase aggregate welfare, but typically redistributes surplus from consumers to firms.
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