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Competitive Information Degradation.

van den Berghe, John.

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Competitive Information Degradation.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Competitive Information Degradation./
作者:	van den Berghe, John.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	50 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-01A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27993254
ISBN:	9798662406537

Competitive Information Degradation.
van den Berghe, John.

Competitive Information Degradation. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 50 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Typically, firms respond to competition by offering products to consumers at lower prices; however, will they also offer better information? In a simple market for a homogeneous product, the answer to this question is no. In fact, increased competition results in worse information provision, which adversely affects firms and sometimes consumers. More search from consumers lowers prices and diminishes firms' ability to internalize the value of consumer information, resulting in firms increasingly diluting signals in order to sell to larger groups of lower-value consumers. These additional sales target those consumers who value the product below the production cost, which increases inefficiency, particularly in the competitive limits of these markets. In the competitive limit, either, firms provide no useful information (i.e., firms never provide information that could sway consumer purchase decision), or, all gains from trade vanish. Although some standard simplification techniques are rendered useless in homogeneous products settings, tractable equilibrium is observed when firms have incentive to minimize the interaction between experiments. The duopoly equilibrium is shown to be unique in a limit, as firms' costs to structure information are arbitrarily small.

ISBN: 9798662406537Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Consumer information

Competitive Information Degradation.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-01, Section: A.
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520 $a Typically, firms respond to competition by offering products to consumers at lower prices; however, will they also offer better information? In a simple market for a homogeneous product, the answer to this question is no. In fact, increased competition results in worse information provision, which adversely affects firms and sometimes consumers. More search from consumers lowers prices and diminishes firms' ability to internalize the value of consumer information, resulting in firms increasingly diluting signals in order to sell to larger groups of lower-value consumers. These additional sales target those consumers who value the product below the production cost, which increases inefficiency, particularly in the competitive limits of these markets. In the competitive limit, either, firms provide no useful information (i.e., firms never provide information that could sway consumer purchase decision), or, all gains from trade vanish. Although some standard simplification techniques are rendered useless in homogeneous products settings, tractable equilibrium is observed when firms have incentive to minimize the interaction between experiments. The duopoly equilibrium is shown to be unique in a limit, as firms' costs to structure information are arbitrarily small.
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