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Kant's Transcendental Idealism and A...

Stolte, S. Matthew.

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Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Analogical Predication.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Analogical Predication./
作者:	Stolte, S. Matthew.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	304 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-09A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27663778
ISBN:	9781392652589

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Analogical Predication.
Stolte, S. Matthew.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Analogical Predication. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 304 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Catholic University of America, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

I argue for an interpretation of Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves (his doctrine of transcendental idealism). Traditional interpretations have understood it as a metaphysical distinction that concerns the basic structure of reality. But on these readings, the distinction raises two problems in particular that are difficult to resolve. The first has to do with whether and in what sense the object which appears is identical with a thing in itself. The second has to do with a problem of reference: is it possible for us to refer successfully to things in themselves, and if not how can the concept of a thing in itself function in Kant's philosophy? In order to avoid these problems, some interpreters have defended the view that the distinction is not metaphysical at all; it concerns not things but only the way we think about things. I argue that these deflationary readings cannot do justice to Kant's text; we have to treat the distinction as metaphysical. But I also show that the paradoxes of the traditional readings can be avoided in light of Kant's doctrine of 'symbolic judgments' or 'judgments according to analogy'. The distinction is metaphysical; it concerns the way things are. But it cannot be understood according to a traditional species and genus framework. The distinction marks out different ways of being without marking out different kinds of being, and our representation of this distinction requires using judgments according to analogy. I introduce Kant's doctrine of analogy by a comparison with Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of analogy, who employed analogy to resolve similar metaphysical paradoxes. Then I develop Kant's doctrine on his own terms and show how it can be used for a fresh interpretation of transcendental idealism.

ISBN: 9781392652589Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Analogy

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Analogical Predication.
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