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The Event of Mind.

Conuel, Brendan T.

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The Event of Mind.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The Event of Mind./
作者:	Conuel, Brendan T.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	420 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-10B.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27663260
ISBN:	9781658471220

The Event of Mind.
Conuel, Brendan T.

The Event of Mind. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 420 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Why are brains able to experience their world? This perennial question is known in philosophy of mind as the Hard Problem of consciousness. Panpsychism, the thesis that mind is fundamental and ubiquitous in the universe, has received increased attention in recent years as an attractive alternative to physicalism and dualism for addressing the Hard Problem. Widespread adoption of panpsychism, however, has been hampered by what is known as the combination problem: even if we stipulate that every tiny bit of physical matter possesses some analogously tiny shred of subjective experience, how is it possible for all those "little" experiences to fuse into something like the one "big" experience us humans enjoy? In The Event of Mind, I argue that the intransigence of the combination problem is a consequence of our continued adherence to a misguided conceptual picture of the physical world. Specifically, I contend that we still think about the basic building blocks of physical reality as persistent things when our best physical theories exhort us rather to conceive of them as ephemeral events. I defend a view under which it is appropriate for metaphysics to be empirically informed in the first place, and I then go on to develop a Whitehead-inspired, event-realist metaphysics adequate to our best physical theories. With this metaphysics in hand, I proceed to reassess panpsychism's combination problem, discovering new potential venues for its dissolution by way of the application of event-realist metaphysics to information theory. I ultimately conclude that this position is plausible and offers a way forward on the combination problem but does entail certain costs and concessions, including commitments to strong, anti-Humean causality and some rather exotic mereological notions.

ISBN: 9781658471220Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Combination problem

The Event of Mind.
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