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Essays on Information in Dynamic Gam...

Kim, Daehyun.

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Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design./
作者:	Kim, Daehyun.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	154 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-12A.
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13895936
ISBN:	9781392224472

Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.
Kim, Daehyun.

Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 154 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p ∈ [0, 1]N and N ∈ N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable.In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K ∈ N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.

ISBN: 9781392224472Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Asymmetric information

Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 154 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Obara, Ichiro.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p ∈ [0, 1]N and N ∈ N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable.In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K ∈ N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
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650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
653 $a Asymmetric information
653 $a Dynamic games
653 $a Mechanism design
653 $a Repeated games
653 $a Robust mechanism
653 $a Type space
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690 $a 0511
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