東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Do Vesting Requirements Increase the...

Clark, Jeffrey Douglas.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees?

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees?/
Author:	Clark, Jeffrey Douglas.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	110 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-03A.
Subject:	Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13885138
ISBN:	9781085721752

Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees?
Clark, Jeffrey Douglas.

Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees? - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 110 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

My dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter's primary purpose is to introduce readers to my dissertation. In it, I note the importance of research on motivating employees to provide effort. I also introduce my specific topic, how vesting requirements moderate the effectiveness of stock-based compensation in motivating employee effort, and discuss challenges that researchers confront when studying employee effort. In the second chapter, my co-authors, Willie Choi and Adam Presslee, and I identify seven factors researchers should consider when designing a real-effort task to ensure a strong, positive, and consistent link between participants' effort intensity and their performance. With these factors in mind, we design an experiment to test for incentive effects on effort and performance using three effort-intensive tasks: the decode task, the letter search task, and the slider task. Contrary to our expectation, we find significant variation across tasks in our ability to detect incentive effects and limit the effects of the seven factors, with the strongest evidence coming from the slider task. Our list of factors helps researchers design effort-intensive tasks that allow them to conduct a more effective test of theory. Following this conclusion, I use the slider task to effectively test the theories I use in the third chapter of this dissertation. In the third chapter, I provide evidence that firms commonly compensate rank-and-file employees with restricted stock that has vesting requirements, despite economic arguments that it is a less effective incentive than cash. Using an experiment, I investigate whether restricted stock compensation can motivate greater employee effort than other economically equivalent contracts. First, I demonstrate individuals view restricted stock compensation as a penalty contract. Second, I leverage research on framing and the endowment effect to predict a penalty-framed stock contract (representing restricted stock) will be valued more highly and motivate greater effort than an economically equivalent penalty-framed cash contract or an economically equivalent bonus-framed stock or cash contract. The results of my experiment are consistent with this prediction. That is, I find effort is greatest under a contract with the features of restricted stock with vesting requirements, which helps explain the prevalence of such compensation arrangements for rank-and-file employees.

ISBN: 9781085721752Subjects--Topical Terms:

557516
Accounting.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Bonus

Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees?
LDR:03618nmm a2200373 4500 001 2267128
005 20200623111704.5
008 220629s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781085721752
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI13885138
035 $a AAI13885138
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Clark, Jeffrey Douglas. $3 3544369
245 1 0 $a Do Vesting Requirements Increase the Incentive Effects of Stock Compensation for Rank-and-File Employees?
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 110 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Moser, Donald V.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a My dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter's primary purpose is to introduce readers to my dissertation. In it, I note the importance of research on motivating employees to provide effort. I also introduce my specific topic, how vesting requirements moderate the effectiveness of stock-based compensation in motivating employee effort, and discuss challenges that researchers confront when studying employee effort. In the second chapter, my co-authors, Willie Choi and Adam Presslee, and I identify seven factors researchers should consider when designing a real-effort task to ensure a strong, positive, and consistent link between participants' effort intensity and their performance. With these factors in mind, we design an experiment to test for incentive effects on effort and performance using three effort-intensive tasks: the decode task, the letter search task, and the slider task. Contrary to our expectation, we find significant variation across tasks in our ability to detect incentive effects and limit the effects of the seven factors, with the strongest evidence coming from the slider task. Our list of factors helps researchers design effort-intensive tasks that allow them to conduct a more effective test of theory. Following this conclusion, I use the slider task to effectively test the theories I use in the third chapter of this dissertation. In the third chapter, I provide evidence that firms commonly compensate rank-and-file employees with restricted stock that has vesting requirements, despite economic arguments that it is a less effective incentive than cash. Using an experiment, I investigate whether restricted stock compensation can motivate greater employee effort than other economically equivalent contracts. First, I demonstrate individuals view restricted stock compensation as a penalty contract. Second, I leverage research on framing and the endowment effect to predict a penalty-framed stock contract (representing restricted stock) will be valued more highly and motivate greater effort than an economically equivalent penalty-framed cash contract or an economically equivalent bonus-framed stock or cash contract. The results of my experiment are consistent with this prediction. That is, I find effort is greatest under a contract with the features of restricted stock with vesting requirements, which helps explain the prevalence of such compensation arrangements for rank-and-file employees.
590 $a School code: 0178.
650 4 $a Accounting. $3 557516
650 4 $a Labor economics. $3 642730
653 $a Bonus
653 $a Effort
653 $a Endowment effect
653 $a Framing
653 $a Penalty
653 $a Stock
690 $a 0272
690 $a 0510
710 2 $a University of Pittsburgh. $b Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business. $3 3542311
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-03A.
790 $a 0178
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13885138