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Strategic Deferment: A Study of the ...

Hoffman, Nathan.

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Strategic Deferment: A Study of the Rogue State, Status Quo State Relationship with a Focus on the United States and North Korea.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic Deferment: A Study of the Rogue State, Status Quo State Relationship with a Focus on the United States and North Korea./
作者:	Hoffman, Nathan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	66 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International81-03.
標題:	International relations. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13860532
ISBN:	9781085625128

Strategic Deferment: A Study of the Rogue State, Status Quo State Relationship with a Focus on the United States and North Korea.
Hoffman, Nathan.

Strategic Deferment: A Study of the Rogue State, Status Quo State Relationship with a Focus on the United States and North Korea. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 66 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03.

Thesis (M.A.)--Iowa State University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.

ISBN: 9781085625128Subjects--Topical Terms:

531762
International relations.

Strategic Deferment: A Study of the Rogue State, Status Quo State Relationship with a Focus on the United States and North Korea.
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520 $a The existing nuclear deterrence literature has, as a whole, overlooked rogue states, and especially North Korea. In the first half of this paper, I present a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the differences between how a rogue state acts with and without nuclear weapons. The second half of this paper is a case study focusing on North Korea, examining how North Korea fits into the model. My analysis of the model results in these conclusions: One, North Korea will respond with nuclear weapons if attacked; Two, a nuclear first strike by the U.S. on North Korea is possible if the nuclear taboo is overcome, and; Third, North Korea will not negotiate away its nuclear weapons. With these conclusions in mind, U.S. policy toward North Korea must accept these conclusions adjust accordingly. If the U.S. does not change its policy toward North Korea, the conflict will not continue without resolution.
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