東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essay on Contract Structure in Princ...

Lin, Hong.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models./
作者:	Lin, Hong.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	139 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-06A.
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13420687
ISBN:	9781085572354

Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models.
Lin, Hong.

Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 139 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Designing employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship is a key problem in the modern firm theory. This dissertation investigates this problem from three different angles, (1) the employment contracts in the labor market with procrastinating workers; (2) the behavior of members and reciprocal leaders in group competitions, where leaders can reward members discretionarily; (3) optimal employment contracts when tasks are endogenously designed.For the chapter about the employment contracts as a commitment device, I build an adverse selection model in a labor market of one firm against many workers, where the workers, if self-employed, procrastinate due to their own quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In the equilibrium, the model shows that workers with the least procrastination are self-employed and workers with the most procrastination are part-time employees in a separating equilibrium where the workers' hiring contracts differ by their quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In between, there exist specific ranges of quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors, in each of which the workers sign the same contract in a pooling equilibrium. This model leads to a "position hierarchy" within the firm as well as separation of paid-employment and self-employment in the labor market. For the chapter about the behavior of reciprocal leaders and members in group competitions, I model the model equilibrium when the leaders are reciprocal and show the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium. A laboratory group all-pay auctions was run to test for the model predictions.

ISBN: 9781085572354Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models.
LDR:02570nmm a2200301 4500 001 2264488
005 20200504070428.5
008 220629s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781085572354
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI13420687
035 $a AAI13420687
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Lin, Hong. $3 1948766
245 1 0 $a Essay on Contract Structure in Principal-Agent Problems with Behavioral Models.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 139 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Filiz-Ozbay, Emel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Maryland, College Park, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Designing employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship is a key problem in the modern firm theory. This dissertation investigates this problem from three different angles, (1) the employment contracts in the labor market with procrastinating workers; (2) the behavior of members and reciprocal leaders in group competitions, where leaders can reward members discretionarily; (3) optimal employment contracts when tasks are endogenously designed.For the chapter about the employment contracts as a commitment device, I build an adverse selection model in a labor market of one firm against many workers, where the workers, if self-employed, procrastinate due to their own quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In the equilibrium, the model shows that workers with the least procrastination are self-employed and workers with the most procrastination are part-time employees in a separating equilibrium where the workers' hiring contracts differ by their quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In between, there exist specific ranges of quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors, in each of which the workers sign the same contract in a pooling equilibrium. This model leads to a "position hierarchy" within the firm as well as separation of paid-employment and self-employment in the labor market. For the chapter about the behavior of reciprocal leaders and members in group competitions, I model the model equilibrium when the leaders are reciprocal and show the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium. A laboratory group all-pay auctions was run to test for the model predictions.
590 $a School code: 0117.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a University of Maryland, College Park. $b Economics. $3 1030931
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-06A.
790 $a 0117
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13420687