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Information Design in Service System...

Lingenbrink, David Alan.

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Information Design in Service Systems and Online Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Information Design in Service Systems and Online Markets./
作者:	Lingenbrink, David Alan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	156 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-12B.
標題:	Applied Mathematics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13884129
ISBN:	9781392249048

Information Design in Service Systems and Online Markets.
Lingenbrink, David Alan.

Information Design in Service Systems and Online Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 156 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Cornell University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In mechanism design, the firm has an advantage over its customers in its knowledge of the state of the system, which can affect the utilities of all players. This poses the question: how can the firm utilize that information (and not additional financial incentives) to persuade customers to take actions that lead to higher revenue (or other firm utility)?When the firm is constrained to "cheap talk," and cannot credibly commit to a manner of signaling, the firm cannot change customer behavior in a meaningful way. Instead, we allow firm to commit to how they will signal in advance. Customers can then trust the signals they receive and act on their realization. This thesis contains the work of three papers, each of which applies information design to service systems and online markets.We begin by examining how a firm could signal a queue's length to arriving, impatient customers in a service system. We show that the choice of an optimal signaling mechanism can be written as a infinite linear program and then show an intuitive form for its optimal solution. We show that with the optimal fixed price and optimal signaling, a firm can generate the same revenue as it could with an observable queue and length-dependent variable prices.Next, we study demand and inventory signaling in online markets: customers make strategic purchasing decisions, knowing the price will decrease if an item does not sell out. The firm aims to convince customers to buy now at a higher price. We show that the optimal signaling mechanism is public, and sends all customers the same information.Finally, we consider customers whose ex ante utility is not simply their expected ex post utility, but instead a function of its distribution. We bound the number of signals needed for the firm to generate their optimal utility and provide a convex program reduction of the firm's problem.

ISBN: 9781392249048Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669109
Applied Mathematics.

Information Design in Service Systems and Online Markets.
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