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Three Essays on the Law and Economic...

Lu, Yijia.

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Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Arbitration: Arbitral Institutions on the Path to the Global Economy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Arbitration: Arbitral Institutions on the Path to the Global Economy./
作者:	Lu, Yijia.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	156 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-09, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-09B.
標題:	Medicine. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13841691
ISBN:	9780438907553

Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Arbitration: Arbitral Institutions on the Path to the Global Economy.
Lu, Yijia.

Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Arbitration: Arbitral Institutions on the Path to the Global Economy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 156 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-09, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.

This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.

This dissertation charts the evolution of dispute resolution mechanisms from small communities to institutions beyond contemporary courts. Synthesizing prior works in institutional economics, Chapter 1 presents a unifying framework that characterizes institutional development as a gradual centralization of governance through two important tools: reputational damages and compensatory damages. Applying this framework to view the rise of contemporary courts as the culmination of this centralization process, Chapter 2 points out an intrinsic inefficiency: Contemporary courts adjudicate publicly, leading to deadweight loss in the form of reputational damages. I build a model to show that arbitration can circumvent this inefficiency by affording disputants a renegotiation opportunity following private adjudication. I then apply this model to account for the historical evolution of arbitral institutions in the 20th century under the leadership of the International Chamber of Commerce, and underscore critical elements in the building of strong arbitral institutions. Chapter 3 examines the development of arbitration in the last two decades: as arbitration's cost kept on rising, new hybrid mechanisms combining arbitration and mediation emerged. I analyze and distinguish two simple hybrid mechanisms. Viewed in its entirety, this dissertation continues the path of prior institutional analysis of dispute resolution and contributes an economic analysis of the latest developments in dispute resolution following the rise of contemporary courts.

ISBN: 9780438907553Subjects--Topical Terms:

641104
Medicine.

Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Arbitration: Arbitral Institutions on the Path to the Global Economy.
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