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Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline ...

So, Brian C.

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Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure./
Author:	So, Brian C.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	132 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-12A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13886497
ISBN:	9781392272008

Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure.
So, Brian C.

Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 132 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation is a collection of essays on dynamic games and airline fare structure. Chapter 1 analyzes a two-party, two-district dynamic game of political campaigning. Public information in each district is modeled as a Brownian motion with unknown drift. Two diametrically-opposed parties campaign in order to influence public opin- ion. In equilibrium, the trailing party always campaign in the more favorable district, adopting a "preaching to the choir" strategy. This paper is an immediate two-district extension of Gul and Pesendorfer (2012). The additional dimension yields two new results: (1) parties are willing to campaign in a district where it already has an advantage and (2) parties benefit from an increase in campaign cost.Chapter 2 models a game of patience among restaurant customers. Customers and restaurants have circular spatial types. Customers are randomly matched to restaurants and make accept/reject decisions facing a deadline. Customers sometimes reject in hopes of matching with a more ideal restaurant in the future. When supply is limited, equilibrium makes customers completely impatient in the second half of the game. If a cartel introduces a uniform price to every customer, it will charge a very high price to induce high-quality matches. The cartel yields a striking result: Consumer welfare decreases when exogenous matching rate improves.Chapter 3 solves an airline fare optimization problem. Airlines segment customers primarily via time of arrival to market. In each segment, airlines can further price discriminate customers with a limited number of price points to better capture the area under the demand curve. I solve the problem of joint optimal pricing under a capacity constraint. The optimal fare structure sees prices clustering towards the bottom of the demand curve in any given segment. Common functional forms of demand yields convenient rules-of-thumb for the pricing manager. This work fills in a gap in academia and in industry where there is little linkage between filed fares and demand.

ISBN: 9781392272008Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on Dynamic Games and Airline Fare Structure.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 132 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-12, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Pesendorfer, Wolfgang.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation is a collection of essays on dynamic games and airline fare structure. Chapter 1 analyzes a two-party, two-district dynamic game of political campaigning. Public information in each district is modeled as a Brownian motion with unknown drift. Two diametrically-opposed parties campaign in order to influence public opin- ion. In equilibrium, the trailing party always campaign in the more favorable district, adopting a "preaching to the choir" strategy. This paper is an immediate two-district extension of Gul and Pesendorfer (2012). The additional dimension yields two new results: (1) parties are willing to campaign in a district where it already has an advantage and (2) parties benefit from an increase in campaign cost.Chapter 2 models a game of patience among restaurant customers. Customers and restaurants have circular spatial types. Customers are randomly matched to restaurants and make accept/reject decisions facing a deadline. Customers sometimes reject in hopes of matching with a more ideal restaurant in the future. When supply is limited, equilibrium makes customers completely impatient in the second half of the game. If a cartel introduces a uniform price to every customer, it will charge a very high price to induce high-quality matches. The cartel yields a striking result: Consumer welfare decreases when exogenous matching rate improves.Chapter 3 solves an airline fare optimization problem. Airlines segment customers primarily via time of arrival to market. In each segment, airlines can further price discriminate customers with a limited number of price points to better capture the area under the demand curve. I solve the problem of joint optimal pricing under a capacity constraint. The optimal fare structure sees prices clustering towards the bottom of the demand curve in any given segment. Common functional forms of demand yields convenient rules-of-thumb for the pricing manager. This work fills in a gap in academia and in industry where there is little linkage between filed fares and demand.
590 $a School code: 0181.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
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