東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

New Perspectives about Financial Int...

Shan, Yu.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies./
作者:	Shan, Yu.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	228 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-11A.
標題:	Business administration. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13860496
ISBN:	9781392162835

New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies.
Shan, Yu.

New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 228 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2019.

This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.

This dissertation consists of three chapters that span managerial styles, financial technologies, and social interactions.Chapter 1 Banks increase credit risk-taking in syndicated bank loans when their systemic risk increases; however, the interrelationship across risks depends on bank managerial styles. Using a connectedness sampling method to differentiate patterns of business policy styles and systemic risk-taking among managers, I find that credit risk-taking is more sensitive to the bank's systemic risk if the manager exhibits a preference for systemic risk. Asset-innovating managers (exhibiting a preference for non-traditional forms of income and assets) take higher credit risk in their loan portfolios, but marginally reduce their credit risk during systemic crises. In contrast, liability-innovating managers (relying on non-traditional funding sources) generally take less credit risk, but increase their credit risk during systemic crises. Bank-level differences cannot explain the observed heterogeneity across banks.Chapter 2 This chapter studies whether FinTech mortgage lenders fill the credit gap left by non-FinTech lenders (i.e., traditional banks and non-FinTech shadow banks). Using natural disasters as shocks to local mortgage demand, I find different reactions between FinTech and non-FinTech lenders. First, FinTech lenders and traditional banks expand lending after demand shocks, while non-FinTech shadow banks do not. Second, non-FinTech lenders tighten lending standards after demand shocks, whereas no evidence shows that FinTech lenders change lending standards or risk-taking. Third, non-FinTech lenders tend to "cherry pick" good borrowers after demand shocks, and no similar behavior is observed on FinTech lenders. However, there is little support that FinTech loans originated after demand shocks perform worse. These results suggest that the adoption of financial technologies allows FinTech lenders to meet local credit demand more efficiently.Chapter 3 I examine the effects of social connectivity on the demand for and supply of consumer and small business loans on peer-to-peer (P2P) FinTech sites such as LendingClub. P2P loan demand increases when geographically distant, but socially connected areas have large amounts of past P2P borrowing activity. Both approval rates and quality (as measured by loan grade and interest rates) are higher the greater an area's aggregate online social connections. Performance (i.e., reductions in defaults or delayed payments) is enhanced by social connectivity indicating that information diffusion through online social networks improves lending outcomes for both high and low risk borrowers.

ISBN: 9781392162835Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168311
Business administration.

New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies.
LDR:03883nmm a2200349 4500 001 2209243
005 20191025102904.5
008 201008s2019 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781392162835
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI13860496
035 $a (MiAaPQ)minarees:15421
035 $a AAI13860496
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Shan, Yu. $3 3436325
245 1 0 $a New Perspectives about Financial Intermediation: Disruption by Senior Managers and Financial Technologies.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 228 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-11, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Allen, Linda.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters that span managerial styles, financial technologies, and social interactions.Chapter 1 Banks increase credit risk-taking in syndicated bank loans when their systemic risk increases; however, the interrelationship across risks depends on bank managerial styles. Using a connectedness sampling method to differentiate patterns of business policy styles and systemic risk-taking among managers, I find that credit risk-taking is more sensitive to the bank's systemic risk if the manager exhibits a preference for systemic risk. Asset-innovating managers (exhibiting a preference for non-traditional forms of income and assets) take higher credit risk in their loan portfolios, but marginally reduce their credit risk during systemic crises. In contrast, liability-innovating managers (relying on non-traditional funding sources) generally take less credit risk, but increase their credit risk during systemic crises. Bank-level differences cannot explain the observed heterogeneity across banks.Chapter 2 This chapter studies whether FinTech mortgage lenders fill the credit gap left by non-FinTech lenders (i.e., traditional banks and non-FinTech shadow banks). Using natural disasters as shocks to local mortgage demand, I find different reactions between FinTech and non-FinTech lenders. First, FinTech lenders and traditional banks expand lending after demand shocks, while non-FinTech shadow banks do not. Second, non-FinTech lenders tighten lending standards after demand shocks, whereas no evidence shows that FinTech lenders change lending standards or risk-taking. Third, non-FinTech lenders tend to "cherry pick" good borrowers after demand shocks, and no similar behavior is observed on FinTech lenders. However, there is little support that FinTech loans originated after demand shocks perform worse. These results suggest that the adoption of financial technologies allows FinTech lenders to meet local credit demand more efficiently.Chapter 3 I examine the effects of social connectivity on the demand for and supply of consumer and small business loans on peer-to-peer (P2P) FinTech sites such as LendingClub. P2P loan demand increases when geographically distant, but socially connected areas have large amounts of past P2P borrowing activity. Both approval rates and quality (as measured by loan grade and interest rates) are higher the greater an area's aggregate online social connections. Performance (i.e., reductions in defaults or delayed payments) is enhanced by social connectivity indicating that information diffusion through online social networks improves lending outcomes for both high and low risk borrowers.
590 $a School code: 0046.
650 4 $a Business administration. $3 3168311
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Banking. $2 bicssc $3 1557594
690 $a 0310
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a City University of New York. $b Business. $3 1020697
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 80-11A.
790 $a 0046
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2019
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13860496