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Developmental States' Weak Welfare Regimes but Long-Term Low Inequality: Why Economic Nationalism Promotes Solidarity for Egalitarianism Rather than Conflict for Resource Monopoly.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Developmental States' Weak Welfare Regimes but Long-Term Low Inequality: Why Economic Nationalism Promotes Solidarity for Egalitarianism Rather than Conflict for Resource Monopoly./
作者:	Kim, Seokdong.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	349 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-07, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-07A.
標題:	Asian Studies. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10934179
ISBN:	9780438763685

Developmental States' Weak Welfare Regimes but Long-Term Low Inequality: Why Economic Nationalism Promotes Solidarity for Egalitarianism Rather than Conflict for Resource Monopoly.
Kim, Seokdong.

Developmental States' Weak Welfare Regimes but Long-Term Low Inequality: Why Economic Nationalism Promotes Solidarity for Egalitarianism Rather than Conflict for Resource Monopoly. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 349 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-07, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Claremont Graduate University, 2018.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

My research probes the paradox of East Asian developmental states (henceforth "developmental states") characterized by weak welfare regimes but long-term low inequality. Why did developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, maintain low Gini coefficients until the 1990s despite low social expenditures and weak social safety nets? This paradox is impressive because the conservative party gained its popularity and support from citizens for prioritizing economic growth over redistribution, and sustained its long-term rule for around forty years during the industrialization period until the 1990s. This study illuminates a constructive role that economic nationalism has played in egalitarianism through progressive land reforms, near-full employment, and public education. Developmental states' redistribution mechanisms are characterized as conservative corporatism, which I define as state-led asymmetric coordination with firms but without labor. My research suggests why developmental states succeeded in the dual goals of developmentalism (sustainable economic development) and egalitarianism (long-term low inequality) during the industrialization period. It further examines why these states' alliances reveal increasing inefficiencies in post-developmental states not only regarding resource allocation for economic growth but also regarding the coordination with political institutions after that period. The previous paradigms of development-such as state-led asymmetric alliance with firms but without labor, and weak welfare regimes-do not work efficiently in post-developmental states. My research labels Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the status of developed economies and consolidated democracies in the low economic growth period as post-developmental states. In this dissertation, Part I (Chapters 1-4) identifies the development of welfare regimes in developmental states. Chapter 1 conceptualizes conservative corporatism, created by egalitarian state-building and redistributive industrialization. It questions why both East Asian developmental states and European corporatist states have commonly created corporatism for redistribution mechanisms despite the differences between their conservative and social democratic welfare state development. The development of nationalism is also associated with corporatism. Chapter 2 finds that both developmental states' strong nationalism and European corporatist states' moderate nationalism is associated with conservative corporatism and social democratic corporatism respectively. Despite their difference in ideology, both corporatist regimes have promoted redistribution mechanisms. This chapter argues how nationalism reduces transaction costs for the nation state to resolve collective action problems for long-term low inequality. By extension, Chapter 3 examines how economic nationalism in postwar state-building has promoted plan rationality through land reform and export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Both land reform and EOI have contributed to redistribution policies. Chapter 4 explains developmental states' redistribution mechanisms initiated by progressive land reforms and maintained by distribution and redistribution policies, such as near-full employment and public education, despite developmental states' prioritizing economic development over social welfare. Meanwhile, Part II (Chapters 5-8) explains the increasing inefficiencies of the developmental state model. In Chapter 5, path analysis generalizes developmental states' redistribution mechanisms to extend into world cases beyond East Asia. This chapter explains that developmental states' narrow, asymmetric alliance with firms but without labor will not promote institutional efficiency in resource allocation in the stage of developed economies and economic democratization. This institutional efficiency occurs because the exclusion of labor makes developmental states' redistribution mechanisms incomplete, this incomplete redistribution with increasing inequality diminishes the potential of economic growth, and the collusion between the state and large firms distorts resource allocations. My research defines economic democratization as economic fairness in management, economic decentralization between large and small firms, and a broad consensus between the government, firms, and labor. Chapter 6 explores how the conservative party's dominance or the conservative party-led dominant party system for around forty years between the 1950s and early 1990s was maintained by the alliance between the government and large (or public) firms without the incorporation of labor. It further argues that the decline of the conservative party dominance in developmental states was accompanied by the disintegration of the developmental state model. Chapter 7 explains that, during the industrialization period, Japan and South Korea allied with large firms, while Taiwan established partnership with small firms. Eventually, Chapters 7 and 8 propose that post-developmental states' new formula of development will be economic democratization and social democratic corporatism in the economic dimension, and also consensus democracy in the political dimension. Specifically, this formula includes a balance of interests between large and small firms to realize political economies of a broad consensus between the government, large firms, small firms, and labor. The Conclusion illuminates the merits and pitfalls of the developmental state model, and summarizes the contents of all chapters.

ISBN: 9780438763685Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669375
Asian Studies.

Developmental States' Weak Welfare Regimes but Long-Term Low Inequality: Why Economic Nationalism Promotes Solidarity for Egalitarianism Rather than Conflict for Resource Monopoly.
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506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a My research probes the paradox of East Asian developmental states (henceforth "developmental states") characterized by weak welfare regimes but long-term low inequality. Why did developmental states, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, maintain low Gini coefficients until the 1990s despite low social expenditures and weak social safety nets? This paradox is impressive because the conservative party gained its popularity and support from citizens for prioritizing economic growth over redistribution, and sustained its long-term rule for around forty years during the industrialization period until the 1990s. This study illuminates a constructive role that economic nationalism has played in egalitarianism through progressive land reforms, near-full employment, and public education. Developmental states' redistribution mechanisms are characterized as conservative corporatism, which I define as state-led asymmetric coordination with firms but without labor. My research suggests why developmental states succeeded in the dual goals of developmentalism (sustainable economic development) and egalitarianism (long-term low inequality) during the industrialization period. It further examines why these states' alliances reveal increasing inefficiencies in post-developmental states not only regarding resource allocation for economic growth but also regarding the coordination with political institutions after that period. The previous paradigms of development-such as state-led asymmetric alliance with firms but without labor, and weak welfare regimes-do not work efficiently in post-developmental states. My research labels Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the status of developed economies and consolidated democracies in the low economic growth period as post-developmental states. In this dissertation, Part I (Chapters 1-4) identifies the development of welfare regimes in developmental states. Chapter 1 conceptualizes conservative corporatism, created by egalitarian state-building and redistributive industrialization. It questions why both East Asian developmental states and European corporatist states have commonly created corporatism for redistribution mechanisms despite the differences between their conservative and social democratic welfare state development. The development of nationalism is also associated with corporatism. Chapter 2 finds that both developmental states' strong nationalism and European corporatist states' moderate nationalism is associated with conservative corporatism and social democratic corporatism respectively. Despite their difference in ideology, both corporatist regimes have promoted redistribution mechanisms. This chapter argues how nationalism reduces transaction costs for the nation state to resolve collective action problems for long-term low inequality. By extension, Chapter 3 examines how economic nationalism in postwar state-building has promoted plan rationality through land reform and export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Both land reform and EOI have contributed to redistribution policies. Chapter 4 explains developmental states' redistribution mechanisms initiated by progressive land reforms and maintained by distribution and redistribution policies, such as near-full employment and public education, despite developmental states' prioritizing economic development over social welfare. Meanwhile, Part II (Chapters 5-8) explains the increasing inefficiencies of the developmental state model. In Chapter 5, path analysis generalizes developmental states' redistribution mechanisms to extend into world cases beyond East Asia. This chapter explains that developmental states' narrow, asymmetric alliance with firms but without labor will not promote institutional efficiency in resource allocation in the stage of developed economies and economic democratization. This institutional efficiency occurs because the exclusion of labor makes developmental states' redistribution mechanisms incomplete, this incomplete redistribution with increasing inequality diminishes the potential of economic growth, and the collusion between the state and large firms distorts resource allocations. My research defines economic democratization as economic fairness in management, economic decentralization between large and small firms, and a broad consensus between the government, firms, and labor. Chapter 6 explores how the conservative party's dominance or the conservative party-led dominant party system for around forty years between the 1950s and early 1990s was maintained by the alliance between the government and large (or public) firms without the incorporation of labor. It further argues that the decline of the conservative party dominance in developmental states was accompanied by the disintegration of the developmental state model. Chapter 7 explains that, during the industrialization period, Japan and South Korea allied with large firms, while Taiwan established partnership with small firms. Eventually, Chapters 7 and 8 propose that post-developmental states' new formula of development will be economic democratization and social democratic corporatism in the economic dimension, and also consensus democracy in the political dimension. Specifically, this formula includes a balance of interests between large and small firms to realize political economies of a broad consensus between the government, large firms, small firms, and labor. The Conclusion illuminates the merits and pitfalls of the developmental state model, and summarizes the contents of all chapters.
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