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Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonabl...

Olson, Dustin.

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Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonable Disagreement.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonable Disagreement./
作者:	Olson, Dustin.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	274 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International79-12A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10792394
ISBN:	9780355974911

Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonable Disagreement.
Olson, Dustin.

Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonable Disagreement. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 274 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2018.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Experts often disagree on major issues within their fields of inquiry, despite being epistemic peers-individuals who are equally well informed and equally well equipped to correctly assess those issues. Can they reasonably maintain their disagreement if they recognize each other as epistemic peers? On the one hand, it would be strange to conclude that, as experts, they have unreasonable beliefs in their areas of expertise. And yet, if they indeed recognize each other as epistemic peers, then it seems to fly in the face of rationality that either could believe she is more likely to be right than the other. They are equals in all the relevant ways. Responses in the literature to this type of scenario have trended two ways: to the negative, where it is argued that reasonable disagreement amongst epistemic peers is not possible-the peers should accept one of the conclusions or suspend judgment; and to the positive, where it is argued that peers can reasonably hold steadfast in their beliefs despite peer disagreement. I suggest that the method of inquiry known as reflective equilibrium (RE) provides insight into this debate. RE has hitherto received less attention in epistemology than elsewhere in philosophy, e.g., ethics and social-political philosophy. Focusing on the underlying epistemic features of this method of inquiry, I defend an evidentialist interpretation of RE. From this interpretation, I then argue that RE offers a response to the challenge of disagreement. Likewise, we also uncover some epistemic limitations on RE from rationality constraints emerging from the epistemology of disagreement.

ISBN: 9780355974911Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Reflective Equilibrium and Reasonable Disagreement.
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