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Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans...

Muhtadi, Burhanuddin.

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Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans, Personal Networks, and Winning Margins.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans, Personal Networks, and Winning Margins./
作者:	Muhtadi, Burhanuddin.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	340 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11C.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-11C.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10957398

Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans, Personal Networks, and Winning Margins.
Muhtadi, Burhanuddin.

Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans, Personal Networks, and Winning Margins. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 340 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11C.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Australian National University (Australia), 2018.

How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia? My PhD research starts with this question that has haunted scholars for the last 15 years. Using data from a nationally representative survey, which included an experimental survey, my study demonstrates that vote buying has become central to electoral mobilisation in Indonesia. If we use the highest estimate, one out of three Indonesians was personally exposed to vote buying in Indonesia's most recent national election, making the country the site of the third-largest reported sum of exchange of money for votes in the world, as indicated by voter surveys taken over the last decade. My nationwide survey and massive dataset of local election surveys also show that, among other things, partisanship is a significant predictor of vote buying. The closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to receive offers of vote buying (or to be accepting of the practice). Puzzlingly, however, the number of partisan voters in Indonesia is comparatively small. Only 15 percent of my national survey respondents admitted being close to any political party and this limited number of party loyalist are highly contested among candidates from the same party in the context of Indonesia's open-list proportional systems. When we connect partisanship and distributive politics, we arrive at the centre of a lively scholarly debate that involves two competing camps: the so-called coreversus swing-voter models. The former says vote buying when parties or candidates try to mobilise their core supporters, viewing the practice as being above all about increasing turnout. The latter interprets vote buying as an electoral strategy to sway uncommitted voters. What types of voters do Indonesian politicians target? At first glance, the data I collected from low-level candidates and brokers provide more proof in support of the core-voter strategy than in support of the swing-voter strategy. My in-depth interviews with high-level politicians also reinforce the notion that they prefer to target partisan voters in their vote buying operations. Yet my voter surveys clearly showed that although in relative terms such voters are more likely to be targeted, in absolute numbers vote buying mostly happens among non-partisans. How do we explain this combination of features---actors' insistence that they are targeting partisan voters with the reality that they are mostly providing cash and gifts to non-partisans?Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Buying Votes in Indonesia: Partisans, Personal Networks, and Winning Margins.
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