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Essays in Mechanism Design and Imple...

Jain, Ritesh.

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Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory./
作者:	Jain, Ritesh.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	129 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International80-03A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11005299
ISBN:	9780438590168

Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.
Jain, Ritesh.

Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 129 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2018.

I broadly classify my research in micro-economic theory. This dissertation brings together my work in mechanism design and implementation theory.

ISBN: 9780438590168Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Mechanism Design and Implementation Theory.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Paul Healy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2018.
520 $a I broadly classify my research in micro-economic theory. This dissertation brings together my work in mechanism design and implementation theory.
520 $a In Chapter 1 titled "Generalized Groves Ledyard Mechanisms, (Jointly with Paul Healy) we study Nash implementation in public goods setting. Groves and Ledyard (1977) construct a mechanism for public goods procurement that can be viewed as a directrevelation Groves mechanism in which agents announce a parameter of a quadratic approximation of their true preferences. The mechanism's Nash equilibrium outcomes are efficient. The budget is balanced because Groves mechanisms are balanced for the announced quadratic preferences. Tian (1996) subsequently discovered a richer set of budget-balancing preferences. We replicate the Groves-Ledyard construction using this expanded set of preferences, and uncover a new set of complex mechanisms that generalize the original Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
520 $a In Chapter 2 titled Symmetric Mechanism Design, (Jointly with Yaron Azrieli) we study the extent to which regulators can guarantee fair outcomes by a policy requiring mechanisms to treat agents symmetrically. This is an exercise in mechanism design. Our main result is a characterization of the class of social choice functions that can be implemented under this constraint. In many environments, extremely discriminatory social choice functions can be implemented by symmetric mechanisms, but there are also cases in which symmetry is binding. Our characterization is based on a 'revelation principle' type of result, where we show that a social choice function can be symmetrically implemented if and only if a particular kind of (indirect) symmetric mechanism implements it. We illustrate the result in environments of voting with private values, voting with a common value, and assignment of indivisible goods.
520 $a In Chapter 3 titled Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences, I study the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCC), in a complete information setting, using rationalizability as the solution concept. I find a condition which I call r-monotonicity to be necessary for the rationalizable implementation of an SCC. rmonotonicity is strictly weaker than Maskin monotonicity, a condition introduced by Maskin (1999). If an SCC satisfies a no worst alternative condition and a condition which we call theta F- distinguishability, then it is shown that r-monotonicity is also sufficient for rationalizable implementation. We discuss the strength of these additional conditions. In particular, I find that, whenever there are more than 3 agents a social choice correspondence, which always selects at least two alternatives is rationalizably implementable if and only if it satisfies r-monotonicity. This paper, therefore, extends Bergemann et al. (2011) to the case of social choice correspondences.
590 $a School code: 0168.
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710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Economics. $3 1673045
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 80-03A(E).
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