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Essays on Repeated Games and Mechani...

Song, Yangwei.

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Essays on Repeated Games and Mechanism Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Repeated Games and Mechanism Design./
作者:	Song, Yangwei.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	134 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-02A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10616254
ISBN:	9780355241440

Essays on Repeated Games and Mechanism Design.
Song, Yangwei.

Essays on Repeated Games and Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 134 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2017.

My dissertation consists of two essays: the first essay studies infinitely repeated games in which discount factors can depend on actions; the second essay studies efficient implementation in a single object allocation problem in which valuations are interdependent and agents are ambiguity aversion. The broad theme is to investigate how standard results in the study of game theory need to be modified when we allow for non-standard preferences.

ISBN: 9780355241440Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays on Repeated Games and Mechanism Design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Srihari Govindan; Asen Kochov.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Rochester, 2017.
520 $a My dissertation consists of two essays: the first essay studies infinitely repeated games in which discount factors can depend on actions; the second essay studies efficient implementation in a single object allocation problem in which valuations are interdependent and agents are ambiguity aversion. The broad theme is to investigate how standard results in the study of game theory need to be modified when we allow for non-standard preferences.
520 $a The first chapter studies infinitely repeated games in which the players' rates of time preference may evolve over time, depending on what transpires in the game. A key result is that in any first best equilibrium of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, the players must eventually cooperate. If we assume that the players become more patient as they obtain better outcomes, we show that cooperation prevails from the beginning of the game and is thus the unique outcome of any first best equilibrium. The latter result is suitably extended to all symmetric two player games. A separate contribution is to propose a framework in which intertemporal trade can emerge as a first best equilibrium of a repeated strategic interaction, generating predictions that differ from those in the standard framework.
520 $a The second chapter considers a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend the standard model to accommodate maxmin agents and obtain necessary as well as sufficient conditions under which efficient allocations can be implemented. In particular, we derive a condition that quantifies the amount of ambiguity necessary for efficient implementation. We further show that under some natural assumptions on the preferences, this necessary amount of ambiguity becomes sufficient. Finally, we provide a definition of informational size such that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are sufficiently informationally small.
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