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Shareholder Litigation as a Discipli...
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Talijan, Vuk.
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Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies./
作者:
Talijan, Vuk.
出版者:
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:
118 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-06(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International79-06A(E).
標題:
Management. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11016112
Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
Talijan, Vuk.
Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 118 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-06(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Southern California, 2018.
Shareholder litigation risk varies across time and across firms. When shareholder litigation risk is high, it can increase (decrease) a firm's cash and investment before (after) a lawsuit filing. When shareholder litigation risk is low, little to no impact occurs. A quasi-natural experiment using two legal shocks, In re IPO and CAFA, supports a causal interpretation. Shareholder litigation risk can also impact a firm's debt around the time of a lawsuit filing, but the empirical results are less clear-cut. In addition to the empirical results, I offer a theoretical framework to help explain the changes in cash, investment, and debt around the time of a lawsuit filing. The framework posits that an entrepreneur, at risk of a lawsuit filing, may save cash as a precautionary measure. When the cash accumulates and a lawsuit filing does not occur, an entrepreneur increases investment in hopes of superior future performance. But if future performance wanes notwithstanding, shareholders then file a lawsuit against their entrepreneur. When cash is limited, debt may act as an alternative precautionary measure against a lawsuit filing. Finally, the theoretical framework emphasizes a benefit of shareholder litigation---the option to file a lawsuit against an entrepreneur encourages shareholders to fund projects and to retain entrepreneurs.Subjects--Topical Terms:
516664
Management.
Shareholder Litigation as a Disciplining Device: Evidence From Firms' Financial Policies.
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Shareholder litigation risk varies across time and across firms. When shareholder litigation risk is high, it can increase (decrease) a firm's cash and investment before (after) a lawsuit filing. When shareholder litigation risk is low, little to no impact occurs. A quasi-natural experiment using two legal shocks, In re IPO and CAFA, supports a causal interpretation. Shareholder litigation risk can also impact a firm's debt around the time of a lawsuit filing, but the empirical results are less clear-cut. In addition to the empirical results, I offer a theoretical framework to help explain the changes in cash, investment, and debt around the time of a lawsuit filing. The framework posits that an entrepreneur, at risk of a lawsuit filing, may save cash as a precautionary measure. When the cash accumulates and a lawsuit filing does not occur, an entrepreneur increases investment in hopes of superior future performance. But if future performance wanes notwithstanding, shareholders then file a lawsuit against their entrepreneur. When cash is limited, debt may act as an alternative precautionary measure against a lawsuit filing. Finally, the theoretical framework emphasizes a benefit of shareholder litigation---the option to file a lawsuit against an entrepreneur encourages shareholders to fund projects and to retain entrepreneurs.
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