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Unbundled infrastructure firms: Com...

Hogendorn, Christiaan Paul.

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Unbundled infrastructure firms: Competition and continuing regulation.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Unbundled infrastructure firms: Competition and continuing regulation./
Author:	Hogendorn, Christiaan Paul.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2000,
Description:	164 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-03, Section: A, page: 1106.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International61-03A.
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9965492
ISBN:	9780599701076

Unbundled infrastructure firms: Competition and continuing regulation.
Hogendorn, Christiaan Paul.

Unbundled infrastructure firms: Competition and continuing regulation. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2000 - 164 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 61-03, Section: A, page: 1106.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2000.

Unbundled infrastructure firms provide conduits for electricity transmission, residential communications, etc. but are vertically disintegrated from "content" functions such as electricity generation or world-wide-web pages. These conduits are being deregulated, and this dissertation examines whether the deregulated conduits will behave in an efficient and competitive manner. The dissertation presents three essays, each of which develops a theoretical model of the behavior of conduit firms in a market environment. The first essay considers the prospects for competition between multiple conduits in the emerging market for broadband (high-speed) residential Internet access. It finds that such competition is likely to emerge as demand for these services increase. The second essay shows how a monopoly electricity or natural gas transmission conduit can facilitate collusion between suppliers of the good. It shows that this is an inefficient effect of standard price-cap regulation. The third essay considers the supply chain of residential Internet access and evaluates proposed "open access" regulation that would allow more than one firm to serve customers over the same physical infrastructure. It shows that the amount of content available to consumers does not necessarily increase under open access.

ISBN: 9780599701076Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Unbundled infrastructure firms: Competition and continuing regulation.
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