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Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies./
作者:	Sanovich, Sergey Viktorovich.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	219 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-05A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10928156
ISBN:	9780438634961

Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies.
Sanovich, Sergey Viktorovich.

Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 219 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies how modern autocrats learn the new tools of information manipulation to stay in office and achieve their domestic and foreign policy goals in a more open, diverse, and global information environment. For the previous generation of autocrats, a firm grip on a few TV stations and newspapers guaranteed marginalizing dissent to the point of non-existence. The most direct threat to autocrats' information dominance, therefore, came from the internet-based explosion of news distribution channels, and social media, which have virtually erased the border between news consumers and producers. Chapter 1 offers a classification of options available to modern autocrats to stifle online dissent. I use it to show how the Russian government went from mostly leaving the online media alone to engaging with the opposition through social media, and then eventually abandoning this attempt in favor of creating a large-scale censorship infrastructure while utilizing battle-tested engagement strategies abroad to advance Russia's increasingly expansionist foreign policy. I focus in particular on automated content distribution using bots, including empirical tools to detect and analyze their activity. Even in the traditional media, however, autocrats find it challenging to control the flow of information to the degree they used to just a few decades ago. Access by at least part of the population to unfavorable news prompts autocrats to create political structures allowing them to shift responsibility in order to take credit for victories without taking ownership of the failures. Charismatic strongmen (like Vladimir Putin) often use the unpopular parties they lead (like United Russia) and unpopular cabinets they pick (like Dmitry Medvedev's cabinet) for these purposes. If this arrangement is replicated within the opposition, the prospect for switching away from rule by charismatic but unaccountable strongmen is further diminished. In Chapter 2 I use cueing survey experiments to disentangle the popular appeal of parties and their leaders. Contrary to most assumptions in the literature, I do not find significant difference in attitudes toward parties and leaders in Russia. Neither do I find that high approval by voters translates into the ability to cue them on policy. I do find, however, that a weak party could help its popular leader partially unchain himself from accountability mechanisms. Studying this phenomenon has promise outside of electoral autocracies as well, since in democracies political conflict is also increasingly organized around powerful, charismatic politicians (while established political parties struggle to maintain voters' support). Experiments I describe in Chapter 2 could be applied to studying the level of personalization of politics under different political regimes and help resolving one of the biggest puzzles in the study of political behavior, a fundamental mismatch between the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence regarding the level of personalization in both consolidated democracies and electoral autocracies. Constructing the political system in a way that shelters them from responsibility but allows them to receive full credit for achievements is one way modern autocrats prevent challenges to their rule. The other is denying the opposition the opportunity to exploit their vulnerabilities. Beyond engaging in downright election fraud, this also involves keeping opposition voters demobilized by convincing them that the opposition has no chance of winning, and that even if they were to win, it would have no real impact on policy. To test if the opposition could use campaign messaging to overcome attitudes like that, in Chapter 3 I analyze a get-out-the-vote experiment run by a candidate in a single-member district in Moscow during the 2016 parliamentary elections in Russia. The candidate manipulated the message by emphasizing either the closeness of the elections or the idea that they are too consequential for public policy to be ignored. I fail to find any treatment effects for either the turnout or support for the candidate and her party, but, given a number of significant attenuating factors, conclude that more research is needed to establish if standard mobilization messaging techniques could work for the opposition in the context of electoral autocracy.

ISBN: 9780438634961Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies.
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245 1 0 $a Three Essays on Information Manipulation and Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 219 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-05, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Tucker, Joshua A.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation studies how modern autocrats learn the new tools of information manipulation to stay in office and achieve their domestic and foreign policy goals in a more open, diverse, and global information environment. For the previous generation of autocrats, a firm grip on a few TV stations and newspapers guaranteed marginalizing dissent to the point of non-existence. The most direct threat to autocrats' information dominance, therefore, came from the internet-based explosion of news distribution channels, and social media, which have virtually erased the border between news consumers and producers. Chapter 1 offers a classification of options available to modern autocrats to stifle online dissent. I use it to show how the Russian government went from mostly leaving the online media alone to engaging with the opposition through social media, and then eventually abandoning this attempt in favor of creating a large-scale censorship infrastructure while utilizing battle-tested engagement strategies abroad to advance Russia's increasingly expansionist foreign policy. I focus in particular on automated content distribution using bots, including empirical tools to detect and analyze their activity. Even in the traditional media, however, autocrats find it challenging to control the flow of information to the degree they used to just a few decades ago. Access by at least part of the population to unfavorable news prompts autocrats to create political structures allowing them to shift responsibility in order to take credit for victories without taking ownership of the failures. Charismatic strongmen (like Vladimir Putin) often use the unpopular parties they lead (like United Russia) and unpopular cabinets they pick (like Dmitry Medvedev's cabinet) for these purposes. If this arrangement is replicated within the opposition, the prospect for switching away from rule by charismatic but unaccountable strongmen is further diminished. In Chapter 2 I use cueing survey experiments to disentangle the popular appeal of parties and their leaders. Contrary to most assumptions in the literature, I do not find significant difference in attitudes toward parties and leaders in Russia. Neither do I find that high approval by voters translates into the ability to cue them on policy. I do find, however, that a weak party could help its popular leader partially unchain himself from accountability mechanisms. Studying this phenomenon has promise outside of electoral autocracies as well, since in democracies political conflict is also increasingly organized around powerful, charismatic politicians (while established political parties struggle to maintain voters' support). Experiments I describe in Chapter 2 could be applied to studying the level of personalization of politics under different political regimes and help resolving one of the biggest puzzles in the study of political behavior, a fundamental mismatch between the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence regarding the level of personalization in both consolidated democracies and electoral autocracies. Constructing the political system in a way that shelters them from responsibility but allows them to receive full credit for achievements is one way modern autocrats prevent challenges to their rule. The other is denying the opposition the opportunity to exploit their vulnerabilities. Beyond engaging in downright election fraud, this also involves keeping opposition voters demobilized by convincing them that the opposition has no chance of winning, and that even if they were to win, it would have no real impact on policy. To test if the opposition could use campaign messaging to overcome attitudes like that, in Chapter 3 I analyze a get-out-the-vote experiment run by a candidate in a single-member district in Moscow during the 2016 parliamentary elections in Russia. The candidate manipulated the message by emphasizing either the closeness of the elections or the idea that they are too consequential for public policy to be ignored. I fail to find any treatment effects for either the turnout or support for the candidate and her party, but, given a number of significant attenuating factors, conclude that more research is needed to establish if standard mobilization messaging techniques could work for the opposition in the context of electoral autocracy.
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650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Mass communications. $3 3422380
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773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 80-05A.
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10928156

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