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On the physical security of physical...

Tajik, Shahin.

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On the physical security of physically unclonable functions

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	On the physical security of physically unclonable functions/ by Shahin Tajik.
作者:	Tajik, Shahin.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
面頁冊數:	xx, 79 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Introduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Computer security. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6
ISBN:	9783319758206

On the physical security of physically unclonable functions
Tajik, Shahin.

On the physical security of physically unclonable functions[electronic resource] /by Shahin Tajik. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - xx, 79 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - T-labs series in telecommunication services,2192-2810. - T-labs series in telecommunication services..

Introduction -- Background -- Experimental Setup -- Photonic Side-Channel Analysis -- Laser Fault Injection -- Optical Contactless Probing -- Conclusion.

This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs' security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.

ISBN: 9783319758206

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-75820-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

540555
Computer security.

LC Class. No.: QA76.9.A25

Dewey Class. No.: 005.8

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