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Essays in Microeconomics.

McClellan, Andrew Alan.

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Essays in Microeconomics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Microeconomics./
作者:	McClellan, Andrew Alan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	264 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-12A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10749111
ISBN:	9780438170698

Essays in Microeconomics.
McClellan, Andrew Alan.

Essays in Microeconomics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 264 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.

This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings.

ISBN: 9780438170698Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Microeconomics.
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100 1 $a McClellan, Andrew Alan. $3 3350920
245 1 0 $a Essays in Microeconomics.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 264 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Debraj Ray; Ennio Stacchetti.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings.
520 $a The first chapter, "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," investigates how to design approval rules incentivize an agent to perform experimentation in a dynamic setting about the quality of a project. We study the design of approval rules (when to approve or reject the project) when experimentation must be delegated to an agent with misaligned preferences. The agent bears the cost of experimentation, and while she cannot approve, she can unilaterally walk away from the relationship at any time. With such interim participation constraints, the approval threshold is no longer time-stationary. We characterize the history-dependent optimal rule and show that, conditional on continued experimentation, the approval threshold moves downward sporadically. Specifically, the threshold in force at any time depends on the history of play only via the minimum of the belief history and the current belief regarding project success. While we derive this outcome as a full commitment solution, it can be implemented as an equilibrium even in the absence of regulator commitment. When the agent has private information about the state, these results change along one significant dimension: an agent can choose to receive fast-track approval in the form of an initially depressed approval threshold. On expiry of the fast track, however, the threshold jumps up, in contrast to the previous exercise. Thereafter, the monotone dynamics described earlier reappear. They also have empirical implications that run counter to predictions from single-decision maker problems. Using data on FDA approval decisions, we look at the qualitative and quantitative features of fast track programs, and we uncover new relationships between Type I error rates and the length of clinical trials. The agency considerations in our model provide a explanation for these relationships.
520 $a The second chapter, "Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection," looks at how to elicit information about a project whose profitability changes over time. We study a principal-agent relationship in which the agent has private information about the future profitability of the relationship or a currently operated project, but is biased in favor of continuing the project. When the principal retains liquidation rights over the relationship or project and must introduce distortions in the liquidation policy itself in order to elicit the agent's private information. The optimal policy consists of a threshold which, if the profitability falls below, triggers liquidation. When the agent reports a higher growth rate of the projects profitability, the optimal threshold will be either decreasing over time and approach the principal's first-best level (i.e., the distortions from eliciting the agent's information are temporary) or will be increasing and divergent over time (i.e., liquidation at later times takes place at unboundedly inefficient levels). A simple condition on the relative profitability of the project across agent types tells us when the distortions are temporary or permanent. These results are robust to the use of transfers (e.g., wage payments) provided that a limited liability condition is respected for the agent. They are also robust to the use of direct auditing methods to assess profitability. The model provides a tractable way to analyze contractual distortions in the pretense of private information, and in particular, shows that contracts simultaneously front- and back-loaded across a menu of options in the same principal-agent relationship.
520 $a Finally, in the third chapter, "Knowing Your Opponent: Auction Design with Asymmetries," I study how much information to reveal about bidders in an auction. A famous result in the auction literature is that in a common-value auction, the auctioneer can raise revenue by revealing information about the value of the good being auctioned. In this paper, we ask whether a similar result exists when the auctioneer reveals information about the type of bidders in the auction (e.g., the precision of their information structure). We consider a model in which "type" corresponds to signal precision, or a possible private-value advantage, and study equilibrium in these multi-dimensional settings. We establish the existence of equilibrium and then turn to questions of auction design. Specifically, we demonstrate that the public disclosure of all bidder types decreases revenue compared to the case in which types remain private knowledge. Simple examples show that this decrease can be very large. Our finding speaks to the benefits of keeping bidder's types hidden as a simple and easily implementable element of auction design.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a New York University. $b Economics. $3 1032403
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-12A(E).
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
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793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10749111