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Theoretical Investigations of Partne...

Fukai, Hiroki.

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Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money./
Author:	Fukai, Hiroki.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
Description:	73 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11A(E).
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10629050
ISBN:	9781369991536

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
Fukai, Hiroki.

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 73 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.

This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter examines the turnover of multiperiod partnerships. The turnover of multiperiod partnerships such as marriages, labor contracts, and joint ventures varies over time and across countries. A model is set out in which thesedifferent observations arise as multiple equilibria. In a random pairwise matching model, players are heterogeneous in time preference and each pair plays a prisoners' dilemma game with random payoffs from mutual cooperation. Two steady states are constructed: in one, non-myopic players cooperate even when a match has low payoffs from mutual cooperation; in the other, they cooperate only when a match has high payoffss from it. Transition dynamics across the two steady states are studied. For a numerical example, it is shown that a transition in either direction is an equilibrium.

ISBN: 9781369991536Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
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100 1 $a Fukai, Hiroki. $3 3350537
245 1 0 $a Theoretical Investigations of Partnership Turnover and of Money.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 73 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Neil Wallace.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.
520 $a This dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter examines the turnover of multiperiod partnerships. The turnover of multiperiod partnerships such as marriages, labor contracts, and joint ventures varies over time and across countries. A model is set out in which thesedifferent observations arise as multiple equilibria. In a random pairwise matching model, players are heterogeneous in time preference and each pair plays a prisoners' dilemma game with random payoffs from mutual cooperation. Two steady states are constructed: in one, non-myopic players cooperate even when a match has low payoffs from mutual cooperation; in the other, they cooperate only when a match has high payoffss from it. Transition dynamics across the two steady states are studied. For a numerical example, it is shown that a transition in either direction is an equilibrium.
520 $a The last three chapters are contributions to monetary economics. In the second chapter, written jointly with Yu Awaya, a counter-example to the notion that money is memory is provided---one that relies on incomplete information. For it, there exists an implementable allocation with money which is not implementable with memory. The result arises because money conveys only a limited amount of information about past actions which can be beneficial in settings with incomplete information.
520 $a In the third chapter, I examine a necessary condition for fiat money to be essential. Fiat money, an intrinsically useless object, is said to be essential if some good allocations are achieved with it but not without it. It is shown that imperfect monitoring is necessary for money to be essential in a large class of economic environments. This provides a guide for the construction of models in which monetary trade achieves good outcomes.
520 $a In the fourth chapter, written jointly with Yu Awaya, it is shown that a seemingly strong condition is not sufficient for money to be essential. Money is thought to be essential when it is difficult to monitor others' behavior. We provide a counterexample to the view. For it, it is shown that even if there is no monitoring, money is inessential---the first best allocation can be attained without money (or any other form of monitoring).
590 $a School code: 0176.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
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710 2 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $b College of the Liberal Arts. $3 3350538
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-11A(E).
790 $a 0176
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10629050