東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on the Design and Industrial ...

Kireyev, Pavel.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets./
作者:	Kireyev, Pavel.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	146 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-10A(E).
標題:	Marketing. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10610002
ISBN:	9781369837490

Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets.
Kireyev, Pavel.

Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 146 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (D.B.A.)--Harvard University, 2016.

The internet has revolutionized marketing. Firms use the internet to procure advertising content, reach consumers, and offer a convenient channel of purchase. Given the growing importance of the internet, marketers must learn to take advantage of new marketplaces and channels. This research examines how the economic design of electronic marketplaces and online channels affects consumer and firm behavior. The first chapter examines the effects of prize structure and entry limits on participant behavior and idea quality in a freelance marketplace where popular advertisers such as P&G and Unilever organize contests to procure ideas for advertising content. It presents a structural model and uses counterfactual simulations to show that although the number of prizes does not appear to affect contest outcomes, prize amount and submission limits may have a significant impact that depends on participant heterogeneity and information. The second chapter uses a structural model and counterfactual simulations to explore how different expiration and pricing policies in a marketplace that offers deeply discounted but expiring deals for products affects the purchase and redemption behavior of consumers and the pricing decisions of merchants. This chapter sheds light on recent marketing regulation that befell the daily deals industry. The third and final chapter studies the decisions of retailers who operate both an online and a store channel to match their own prices across channels in a variety of competitive settings. It uses an analytical game theory model to show that different self-matching configurations may emerge in equilibrium, and that self-matching pricing policies may increase retailer profits.

ISBN: 9781369837490Subjects--Topical Terms:

536353
Marketing.

Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets.
LDR:02661nmm a2200301 4500 001 2160977
005 20180803131930.5
008 190424s2016 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781369837490
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10610002
035 $a (MiAaPQ)vireo:harvard54Kireyev
035 $a AAI10610002
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kireyev, Pavel. $3 3348912
245 1 0 $a Essays on the Design and Industrial Organization of Online Markets.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 146 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Elie Ofek.
502 $a Thesis (D.B.A.)--Harvard University, 2016.
520 $a The internet has revolutionized marketing. Firms use the internet to procure advertising content, reach consumers, and offer a convenient channel of purchase. Given the growing importance of the internet, marketers must learn to take advantage of new marketplaces and channels. This research examines how the economic design of electronic marketplaces and online channels affects consumer and firm behavior. The first chapter examines the effects of prize structure and entry limits on participant behavior and idea quality in a freelance marketplace where popular advertisers such as P&G and Unilever organize contests to procure ideas for advertising content. It presents a structural model and uses counterfactual simulations to show that although the number of prizes does not appear to affect contest outcomes, prize amount and submission limits may have a significant impact that depends on participant heterogeneity and information. The second chapter uses a structural model and counterfactual simulations to explore how different expiration and pricing policies in a marketplace that offers deeply discounted but expiring deals for products affects the purchase and redemption behavior of consumers and the pricing decisions of merchants. This chapter sheds light on recent marketing regulation that befell the daily deals industry. The third and final chapter studies the decisions of retailers who operate both an online and a store channel to match their own prices across channels in a variety of competitive settings. It uses an analytical game theory model to show that different self-matching configurations may emerge in equilibrium, and that self-matching pricing policies may increase retailer profits.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Marketing. $3 536353
650 4 $a Commerce-Business. $3 3168423
690 $a 0338
690 $a 0505
710 2 $a Harvard University. $b Marketing. $3 3191516
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-10A(E).
790 $a 0084
791 $a D.B.A.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10610002