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Essays in Politics and Policy.

Evangelakis, Peter.

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Essays in Politics and Policy.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Politics and Policy./
作者:	Evangelakis, Peter.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	138 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-02A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10616592
ISBN:	9780355234954

Essays in Politics and Policy.
Evangelakis, Peter.

Essays in Politics and Policy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 138 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2017.

1) Politicians and voters sometimes make decisions that conflict with their ideological position. I show that the presence of policy adjustment costs can generate this type of behavior in an electoral setting. Specifically, I study a two period model in which an incumbent sets policy, the median voter chooses between the incumbent and an opposite party challenger, and the winner of the election can change policy. A small change is costless but a larger change induces a strictly positive adjustment cost. If the politicians are highly polarized, then the incumbent can choose her preferred policy in both periods and guarantee her re-election, even if she is somewhat more extreme than the challenger. Otherwise, she has to decide between guaranteeing that the election winner chooses her preferred policy during period 2 and guaranteeing her re-election. If she is not highly office-motivated, then she accomplishes the former by choosing a policy that is slightly more extreme than her preferred policy. If she is highly office-motivated and political polarization is sufficiently low, then she accomplishes the latter by choosing the most moderate policy on the other side of the political spectrum. The median voter is best off in this case.

ISBN: 9780355234954Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Politics and Policy.
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520 $a 1) Politicians and voters sometimes make decisions that conflict with their ideological position. I show that the presence of policy adjustment costs can generate this type of behavior in an electoral setting. Specifically, I study a two period model in which an incumbent sets policy, the median voter chooses between the incumbent and an opposite party challenger, and the winner of the election can change policy. A small change is costless but a larger change induces a strictly positive adjustment cost. If the politicians are highly polarized, then the incumbent can choose her preferred policy in both periods and guarantee her re-election, even if she is somewhat more extreme than the challenger. Otherwise, she has to decide between guaranteeing that the election winner chooses her preferred policy during period 2 and guaranteeing her re-election. If she is not highly office-motivated, then she accomplishes the former by choosing a policy that is slightly more extreme than her preferred policy. If she is highly office-motivated and political polarization is sufficiently low, then she accomplishes the latter by choosing the most moderate policy on the other side of the political spectrum. The median voter is best off in this case.
520 $a 2) I examine the socially optimal term length of an unelected policy-maker (e.g., a bureaucrat) when his current policy choice can influence the payoff from a future policy choice his office will make. In particular, I measure term length by the policy-maker's retention probability, i.e., the probability that he will remain in office to make that future policy choice instead of being replaced before it arises. There are two main classes of result. First, if the policy-maker and citizens are guaranteed to agree about the immediate value of the current policy but there is sufficient scope for disagreement about the value of the future policy, then the uniquely optimal retention probability is zero. Second, if the policy-maker and citizens can disagree about the value of both policies, then there are conditions under which the uniquely optimal retention probability is zero, but there are also conditions under which all retention probabilities (e.g., zero) are weakly optimal and conditions under which the uniquely optimal retention probability is one. The key determinant is whether a given citizen's continuation value from the passage of the current policy is greater than, equal to, or less than the continuation value of a policy-maker who is guaranteed to remain in power.
520 $a 3) Laws that constrain the size of local government budgets, often called tax and expenditure limits, exist in over half of U.S. states. I study the effects of one such statute passed in Florida in 2007 that required local governments to cut property tax levies. Specifically, I use a regression discontinuity approach to determine the impact of the statute on the size and composition of municipal government revenues. Using detailed budget data, I find evidence of substitution away from tax revenues and towards revenue from fees.
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