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Essays on Contract Theory and Mechan...

Rodivilov, Alexander.

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Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design./
作者:	Rodivilov, Alexander.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	117 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-01A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10287217
ISBN:	9780355120790

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
Rodivilov, Alexander.

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 117 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2017.

My dissertation investigates optimal contracts for experimentation and a matching problem for the runway slot allocation. The first chapter of my dissertation examines the role of monitoring in experimentation where agents may observe success privately. In the benchmark model without monitoring, private observability of success is inconsequential as the agent never wants to delay announcing success. However, with monitoring of the agent's effort, private observability of success plays a role in choosing the optimal time for monitoring. When success is observed publicly, the optimal time for a principal to hire a monitor is at the start of the relationship. On the contrary, if the agent observes success privately, and the discount factor is high enough, monitoring is performed during the final period. The second chapter discusses optimal contracts for both experimentation and production. It can be optimal to pay a rent after failure and over experimentation can be optimal. Over production can occur in the exploitation phase. The third chapter considers a financially significant matching problem that emerges when inclement weather conditions strike an airport and runway slots must be reallocated.

ISBN: 9780355120790Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design.
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