東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception,...

Rosenzweig, Steven C.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition./
作者:	Rosenzweig, Steven C.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	168 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-11A(E).
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10632554
ISBN:	9780355028034

Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition.
Rosenzweig, Steven C.

Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 168 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2017.

How does violence shape voting in competitive elections? Why do politicians foment violence, and does it have the intended effect? Are politicians' decisions to employ violence based on an accurate assessment of its relative costs and benefits as an electoral tactic?

ISBN: 9780355028034Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition.
LDR:04947nmm a2200325 4500 001 2157225
005 20180531091029.5
008 190424s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355028034
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10632554
035 $a AAI10632554
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Rosenzweig, Steven C. $3 3345025
245 1 0 $a Voter Backlash, Elite Misperception, and the Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 168 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Thad Dunning; Susan Stokes.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2017.
520 $a How does violence shape voting in competitive elections? Why do politicians foment violence, and does it have the intended effect? Are politicians' decisions to employ violence based on an accurate assessment of its relative costs and benefits as an electoral tactic?
520 $a Existing theories of election-related violence have sought to explain it in terms of the various electoral benefits it is said to provide. Some theories highlight the coercive effects of violence, while others emphasize its ability to persuade. Yet far less attention has been paid to the costs of violence as an electoral tactic. including the potential for voter backlash against the parties and candidates that use it. Furthermore, the literature tends to assume that politicians who incite violence do so based on an accurate assessment of its relative costs and benefits. This dissertation provides evidence that, in fact, voter backlash against violence is greater and more broad-based than both scholars and politicians tend to assume. Moreover, the backlash may be large enough to offset any advantages that violence provides, calling into question the efficacy of violent campaign tactics overall.
520 $a I explore the logic of election-related violence with evidence from Kenya, an important case in the literature. Combining data from survey experiments with voters and politicians and qualitative interviews with the latter, I find that politicians significantly underestimate the negative repercussions of employing violence on their support among voters. Specifically, politicians see violence as at worst irrelevant and at best helpful in their efforts to win office, believing they can use it to prevent opposition supporters from voting while maintaining---and possibly enhancing---their support among core, coethnic voters. Yet survey experiments with voters show that the use of violence as well as the hostile ethnic rhetoric that often leads to it sharply reduces voter support for the candidates who use it, including among coethnics. Furthermore, and consistent with the idea of a sizable voter backlash against violence, analyses of observational data on violence and local election outcomes uncover no evidence that violence helps and some evidence that it hurts candidates' efforts to win office. Election-related violence in Kenya may therefore be understood, at least partially, to be the result of elite misperception about the effects of violence on their electoral prospects.
520 $a The findings point to a need for research to more carefully evaluate the costs of violent electoral tactics in addition to its apparent benefits. While the literature has done well in identifying the ways in which violence may help candidates at the polls, it has paid far less attention to the potential costs of violence as an electoral tactic, including the possibility of voter backlash among those who turn out to vote. We should also ask more explicitly whether and how political elites are able to accurately assess the relative costs and benefits of violence as they decide what strategies to employ when competing in elections. Do they properly account for negative voter reactions to violence, or do they underestimate the potential for such a response? The evidence presented here suggests the latter. The findings also highlight the role that elite misperception can play in the existence and persistence of violence in electoral competition. Even where violent coercion has its advantages, it may still provoke a backlash from voters that sharply diminishes or eliminates any net benefits that violence provides. Yet the evidence presented here suggests that politicians fail to consider this possibility in their decisionmaking calculus and therefore perceive violence as a more unambiguously effective tactic than it actually is. This misperception can help to explain why violence occurs in the course of electoral competition, even in situations where the true gains from it are limited.
590 $a School code: 0265.
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a African studies. $3 2122725
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0293
710 2 $a Yale University. $3 515640
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-11A(E).
790 $a 0265
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10632554