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Essays on Behavioral Economics.

Sengupta, Arjun.

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Essays on Behavioral Economics.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Behavioral Economics./
Author:	Sengupta, Arjun.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
Description:	168 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-07A(E).
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10392964
ISBN:	9781369592054

Essays on Behavioral Economics.
Sengupta, Arjun.

Essays on Behavioral Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 168 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2016.

Promises and Guilt.

ISBN: 9781369592054Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Behavioral Economics.
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100 1 $a Sengupta, Arjun. $3 759972
245 1 0 $a Essays on Behavioral Economics.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 168 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-07(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Lucas Coffman.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2016.
520 $a Promises and Guilt.
520 $a The central question this paper explores is ``Do people keep their promise to avoid expectation-based guilt?" Using a novel design wherein we endogenously vary the promisor(apostrophe)s expectation of what the promisee expects from him, we find that promisors are heterogeneous in their reasons for keeping their promise. Though we find that behavior of some subjects are consistent with guilt-aversion hypothesis, a larger group of subjects keep their promise regardless of what the promisee expects.
520 $a Timing of Communication and Deception.
520 $a In many situations individuals can make false statements about their actions with intent to deceive. We investigate if the timing of such statements - either before or after an individual takes an action - affects propensity to engage in deceptive behavior. In a controlled laboratory experiment, using a real-effort task we show that messages sent promising a future action are more inflated and less informative than messages sent reporting on a past act. These results are consistent with individuals(apostrophe) moral costs of engaging in deception being different across the two timings.
520 $a Status and Competition.
520 $a This paper investigates the effect of ascribed social status on an individual(apostrophe)s willingness to compete. We hypothesize that those who enjoy a higher status in society may be more willing to compete than those who enjoy lower status. Thus even in the absence of discrimination from a competitive labor market, we would observe income disparity and lower labour participation for lower status individuals.We first manipulate social status in the lab and then measure each individual(apostrophe)s willingness to compete in a mixed group of two high status and two low status individuals. We find no difference in choice to compete between low and high status individuals even though high status individuals were overconfident about their performance.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a The Ohio State University. $b Economics. $3 1673045
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-07A(E).
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10392964