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Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechani...

Ovadia, David Alexander.

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Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechanism Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechanism Design./
作者:	Ovadia, David Alexander.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	149 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-05A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3741436
ISBN:	9781339337197

Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechanism Design.
Ovadia, David Alexander.

Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 149 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.

In the first chapter, we consider an auctioneer who has private information about the quality of several heterogeneous goods that she will sell through simultaneous single-object auctions. When only one object is sold, all information disclosure policies raise the same expected revenue. In particular, the extreme policies of full revelation and no revelation are both optimal. This revelatory indifference is overturned when multiple objects are sold. If the auctioneer keeps silent, bidders will base their participation decisions on a "pooled" estimate of the goods' qualities. On the other hand, revealing some information about the qualities will cause the bidders to sort between the two auctions. We find that the auctioneer prefers to provide some but not all information to the bidders.

ISBN: 9781339337197Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays on Discrete Choice in Mechanism Design.
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300 $a 149 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-05(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Rakesh Vohra.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2015.
520 $a In the first chapter, we consider an auctioneer who has private information about the quality of several heterogeneous goods that she will sell through simultaneous single-object auctions. When only one object is sold, all information disclosure policies raise the same expected revenue. In particular, the extreme policies of full revelation and no revelation are both optimal. This revelatory indifference is overturned when multiple objects are sold. If the auctioneer keeps silent, bidders will base their participation decisions on a "pooled" estimate of the goods' qualities. On the other hand, revealing some information about the qualities will cause the bidders to sort between the two auctions. We find that the auctioneer prefers to provide some but not all information to the bidders.
520 $a In the second chapter, we study the welfare effects of reserve price disclosure in English auctions. In particular, we consider a bilateral trade setting with one seller and one buyer. When the seller employs a public reserve price the English auction is revenue and outcome equivalent to the optimal mechanism. Thus, the seller must weakly prefer a public reserve price to a secret reserve price. In fact, we show that the seller will almost always strictly prefer the public reserve price auction. We then suppose that the auction is conducted by a third-party auctioneer who is restricted to charging percentage commission rates to the seller and buyer. We show that the intermediary-optimal mechanism coincides with the seller-optimal mechanism.
520 $a In the third chapter, we study the impact of early decision applications on enrollment outcomes at universities. To do so, we model the university application process as a set of contests. Specifically, we assume there are two universities, each of which runs an admissions contest with or without an early application option. We find equilibria for the cases in which neither or both universities other early admissions, and then we compare the two cases. We find that low-ability students prefer having an early application option, while high-ability students prefer that neither university offer such an option. We also find that the use of early admissions entails a loss of allocational efficiency.
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