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Essays on no commitment problems.

Nozawa, Wataru.

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Essays on no commitment problems.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on no commitment problems./
作者:	Nozawa, Wataru.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	67 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-03A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3730669
ISBN:	9781339169576

Essays on no commitment problems.
Nozawa, Wataru.

Essays on no commitment problems. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 67 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Oh.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2015.

This dissertation, which consists of three chapters, is about no-commitment problems. The first two chapters are about reconsideration-proofness, which is a solution concept for infinite-horizon decision problems in which a decision-maker cannot commit to future actions. The third chapter deals with a saving problem in which no-commitment also plays a role.

ISBN: 9781339169576Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on no commitment problems.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Neil Wallace.
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520 $a This dissertation, which consists of three chapters, is about no-commitment problems. The first two chapters are about reconsideration-proofness, which is a solution concept for infinite-horizon decision problems in which a decision-maker cannot commit to future actions. The third chapter deals with a saving problem in which no-commitment also plays a role.
520 $a No commitment can be an issue when a decision maker at one point in time has a conflict of interest with himself at another point in time. A standard solution approach for such problems treats the decision maker at different time periods as different selves playing a noncooperative game, and then applies solution concepts in game theory. Subgame perfection has been used as one of main solution concepts (see, for example, Laibson (1994)). Though the use of subgame perfection is successful in capturing the central feature of the problems that the decision maker cannot bind future selves due to no commitment, it has been criticized for assuming a limited set of possible deviations and resulting multiplicity of equilibria. To address the problem, Kocherlakota (1996b) proposes a refinement which is called strong reconsideration-proofness. An attractive feature of strong reconsideration-proofness is that the attained value at equilibria is unique and strong reconsideration-proofness refines subgame perfection to that extent.
520 $a Kocherlakota (1996b) defines reconsideration-proofness for settings without state variables. And he showed for such settings that there exist equilibria that satisfy reconsideration-proofness. In chapter 1, I explore ways of extending the notion so that it applies to settings with state variables. Such an extension is important because many no-commitment problems have state variables. Chapter 1 starts with a seemingly natural generalization of strong reconsideration-proofness that applies to environments with state variables. However, as I show, it leads to nonexistence in three examples. In the first two examples, existence can be recovered using a modification of the solution concept that seems attractive. In the last example, nonexistence occurs even with the modified solution concept. Insights about further research are derived from these nonexistence results.
520 $a Even in settings without state variables, no procedure or algorithm has been proposed for computing reconsideration-proof equilibria. Chapter 2 provides such a procedure. The procedure is applicable under an assumption about time-separability of the utility function. The class of problems that satisfy the assumption includes four of the five examples in Kocherlakota (1996b).
520 $a Chapter 3 is about efficient insurance. Efficient insurance in environments with various frictions has been characterized in the literature (see, for example, Thomas and Worrall (1988)). In some environments, the first-order approach, suggested by Rogerson (1985), is useful in the characterization. This chapter shows that the first-order approach is not valid in an environment with one-sided no commitment and hidden savings, under the assumption that the utility function is CRRA or CARA and that the return on savings is equal to the inverse of the agent's discount factor. The result complements the numerical work in Abraham and Laczo (2014) which suggests that the first-order approach is valid under those frictions when the return on savings is low.
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