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Essays in microeconomics and game th...

Vasquez Ortiz, Jorge Andres.

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Essays in microeconomics and game theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in microeconomics and game theory./
作者:	Vasquez Ortiz, Jorge Andres.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	175 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-10A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10110802
ISBN:	9781339740478

Essays in microeconomics and game theory.
Vasquez Ortiz, Jorge Andres.

Essays in microeconomics and game theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 175 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2016.

Chapter 1 (with Lones Smith) develops an equilibrium theory of crime. Potential victims choose how vigilantly to guard their property, while potential criminals choose whether to enter, and the number and caliber of offenses. Criminals randomly encounter potential victims. Deterrence rises in vigilance and falls in the caliber, and acts as a market-clearing price in the unique equilibrium. Many predictions are counterintuitive due to equilibrium feedback effects, and most new about: the crime rate, attempted crime rate, deterrence, criminal entry, offenses per criminal, criminal caliber, and vigilance expenses. We also measure spillovers of unobservable vigilance, and give a new rationale for Tullock's Paradox.

ISBN: 9781339740478Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in microeconomics and game theory.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Lones Smith.
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520 $a Chapter 1 (with Lones Smith) develops an equilibrium theory of crime. Potential victims choose how vigilantly to guard their property, while potential criminals choose whether to enter, and the number and caliber of offenses. Criminals randomly encounter potential victims. Deterrence rises in vigilance and falls in the caliber, and acts as a market-clearing price in the unique equilibrium. Many predictions are counterintuitive due to equilibrium feedback effects, and most new about: the crime rate, attempted crime rate, deterrence, criminal entry, offenses per criminal, criminal caliber, and vigilance expenses. We also measure spillovers of unobservable vigilance, and give a new rationale for Tullock's Paradox.
520 $a Chapter 2 (with Marek Weretka) investigates the effects of players' mutual empathy on their strategic behavior. We augment the conventional game-theoretic framework by allowing players' utilities to depend on the strategy profile being played and on the realized utilities of others. Players' utilities are not reducible to preferences over strategies; thus, standard solution concepts are inapplicable. We extend the Nash equilibrium by endowing players with beliefs regarding others' payoffs. Using the framework we show that excessive multiplicity of equilibria and payoff inefficiency emerge owing to many supporting beliefs. These features are common in sympathetic games, but not in two-player antipathetic games.
520 $a Chapter 3 develops a theory of decentralized law enforcement in which a continuum of law enforcers chooses an enforcement level to apprehend lawbreakers. A continuum of citizens decides whether to break the law and the severity level of the offense. Assuming that a law enforcer's payoff rises in the number of successfully apprehended lawbreakers, I find that some policies aimed at discouraging law breaking can also reduce the level of enforcement, resulting in fewer citizens breaking the law, but each turning to more severe offenses. Next, I show that announcing and committing to a given level of enforcement leads to higher crime rates and lower apprehension rates, an effect that is aggravated when law enforcement is centralized. Finally, I explore how peer effects in law enforcement impact the levels of apprehension and crime, and also discuss some potential applications of the framework.
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